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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Problem 
 A strong globalization and liberalization process has tied economies in the world to 
become dependent on each other in recent decades. The establishment of the World Trade 
Organization in 1994 has helped to administer multilateral trade agreements. Some 
developing countries have opened their own economies to take full advantage of the 
opportunities for economic development through trade in general, and attracting FDI in 
particular. Despite the ongoing 2008 world economic and financial crisis producing a 
negative impact on FDI operations and the labor market, a tendency of FDI flows towards 
developing countries has emerged. Global FDI inflows in 2009 were $1,114 billion, of 
which 43% flowed to developing countries, compared with 27% in 2007. The preference 
of transnational companies for developing countries in their investment plans might further 
increase over the period 2009-2011, particularly to the benefit of East, South and South-
East Asia, with their growing markets and, to a very limited extent, the availability of 
cheap labor representing the most attractive factors in these sub-regions (UNCTAD, 2009). 
However, with the world economy is becoming integrated, indigenous firms in 
domestic markets are obsessed with a business environment under hard competition with 
foreign affiliates. Moreover, workers in many developing countries are worrying about the 
adverse consequences of trade liberalization, and lagging employment opportunities for 
burgeoning labor forces. A more general concern of workers is that globalization might 
contribute to increased income inequality and poorer working conditions, and that they 
might not benefit from the prosperity that growth would otherwise bring. 
 How is a domestic firm or laborer in a developing economy affected under strong 
globalization and FDI influx? This dissertation contributes to the existing range of 
empirical studies by investigating two main aspects: (1) FDI spillovers to the productivity 
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of domestic firms, and (2) the response of the labor market to trade liberalization in 
Vietnamese manufacturing.  
o Why is Vietnam an interesting case?  
Vietnam is located in South-East Asia, and its integration within the international 
economy has increased significantly over the past decade, aided by substantial trade 
liberalization. After gaining independence in 1945, Vietnam followed a centrally planned 
economy until after the 1975 unification between North and South Vietnam. In 1986, the 
government launched Doi Moi, a restructuring policy toward a market economy, and 
thereafter Vietnam has signed many multilateral and bilateral trade and MFN agreements. 
Furthermore, the country joined ASEAN in 1995, APEC in 1998, and the WTO in 2007. 
Trade liberalization has coincided with GDP growth, which is always among the highest in 
the world. GDP growth accelerated to 9.8% annually in the 1990s, before falling to7.3% in 
the 2000s. FDI inflows increased dramatically from $0.34 billion in 1988 to a peak of 
$71.73 billion in 2008, the year after Vietnam joined the WTO, but then has strongly 
declined due to the world financial crisis (GSO). According to UNCTAD (2008), Vietnam 
was one of the top 6 destinations for FDI in 2008-2010. Among factors such as market 
growth, economic growth prospects, further regional integration and the country opening 
up to FDI, etc., cheap labor is also considered very important. The Vietnamese labor force 
is increasing, with a significant labor movement from the countryside to large cities, 
causing a continuous increase in the proportion of the urban population of working age, for 
example, an increase of 1.8 million people between 2007 and 2009. In 2009, the total labor 
force was 49.3 million persons, accounting for around 57% of the population (MOLISA, 
2010). Based on this brief outlook on the background of the Vietnamese economy, 
Vietnam is an interesting case to pursue researching in the fields of FDI, trade 
liberalization and the labor market. 
o FDI and productivity spillovers:   
 FDI is not only expected to bring additional capital into host economies and 
enhance a competitive environment in domestic markets, but may also bring technical and 
managerial expertise, causing productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic enterprises. 
Productivity spillovers can occur through horizontal linkages of MNEs within their 
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industries or through vertical linkages (buyer-supplier linkages) from foreign firms in 
upstream (forward spillovers) or downstream industries (backward spillovers). Positive 
spillovers can occur via several channels: labor mobility between or within industries, 
demonstration or imitation effects through learning by watching, competition effects by 
improvement, and innovation efforts to remain competitive and productive (Kokko, 1996; 
Wang and Blomström, 1992; Glass and Saggi, 2002). Negative spillovers can appear when 
MNEs create a more competitive market situation, such as domestic firms losing the 
demand of established customers (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
 However, these spillovers could be prevented by internalization effects whereby 
MNEs block technological or managerial expertise leakages toward domestic competitors. 
By contrast, they might be motivated by inter-linkage effects whereby MNEs actively 
transfer knowledge to local suppliers or customers. Positive forward spillovers may arise 
from cheaper and more qualified inputs accession, knowledge and technology transfer 
from foreign MNEs under the pressure of increasing competition (Javorcik, 2004; Caves, 
1996). Positive backward spillovers possibly occur through technical assistance or long-
term contracts (Munday et al., 1995; Imrie and Morris, 1992). Nevertheless, these may be 
counteracted by the negative effects caused by contractual specifics and the market power 
of the seller or buyer (Driffield et al., 2002). Moreover, particular host economy 
characteristics can influence the absorption of such spillovers (Görg and Greenaway, 
2004). 
 Within literature, many empirical studies have focused on investigating the 
evidence of FDI productivity spillovers. In particular, through using cross-sectional or 
panel data at the industry or firm level of developing countries, a large number of studies, 
including Kokko (1996), Sjöholm (1999), and Görg and Strobl (2005) for Mexico, 
Indonesia, and Ghana, respectively, have detected positive effects of horizontal spillovers. 
However, Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Bwalya (2005) find negative horizontal 
spillovers in the cases of Venezuela and Zambia. Aitken and Harrison (1999) capture 
foreign investment entirely from joint ventures, considering that the spillover differs for 
small and large domestic firms.  
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 Recent studies have paid greater attention to the specific characteristics of inward 
FDI and host economies that can affect the spillovers. For instance, Javorcik (2004) is 
interested in effects operating across industries, finding positive backward spillovers 
associated with projects with shared domestic and foreign ownership, yet not with fully 
owned foreign investment. Girma, Görg and Pisu (2008) conclude different scopes and 
scales of horizontal, backward and forward spillovers for export-oriented vs. domestic 
market oriented FDI. Le and Pomfret (2008) and Lan (2008) stress the role of labor size, 
ownership, business orientation, location, mode of entry, the industry’s technology level, 
R&D performing and financial development, whereas Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) 
approach backward spillovers differentiated by the nationalities of foreign investors. 
 As mentioned above, existing literature has found mixed results for developing 
countries. Does the presence of foreign affiliates have positive or negative spillovers on 
local firms’ productivity under trade liberalization in the case of Vietnam? Two papers, in 
chapters 2 and 3 respectively, focus on different directions: (1) FDI spillovers are affected 
by characteristics of domestic firms, i.e. managerial skill and ownership, and the 
relationship between sectors, i.e. manufacturing-to-manufacturing (intra-sector linkages) 
and service-to-manufacturing (inter-sector linkages); and (2) FDI spillovers are 
differentiated by the origin of investors. 
o Trade liberalization and labor market: 
 Globalization is a relevant concern as it might be coupled with rising imports and 
related to job dislocation. Within the framework of the neoclassical trade theory (the 
Heckscher-Ohlin), the Stolper Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941) 
highlight that in the case of two goods and two factors, a decline in the relative price of a 
product reduces both the relative and absolute earnings of the factor used relatively 
intensively in its production. Therefore, when a labor-abundant developing country opens 
up to trade, it would experience a relative and absolute rise in the returns to the owners of 
labor capital, causing a decline in wage inequality. 
 In general, trade can affect employment and wages through several channels: (1) 
trade affects wages through income growth, exports and imports, which can raise 
productivity growth and thus create labor demand for high-skilled jobs; (2) under trade 
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pressure, for example skill-biased technological  change, increased demand for skilled 
labor may lead to wage inequality; and (3) the impact of trade liberalization possibly 
occurs through the channel of industry wage premium, whereby different levels of rent 
sharing between firms and workers among industries can cause wage differentials 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Revenga, 1997). 
 Given this theoretical background, studies within existing literature have reached 
different findings concerning labor market adjustment to trade liberalization.  For instance, 
Ravenga (1997) suggests the negative relation between trade reform and wages and 
employment in Mexico, whereas Stone and Cepeda (2011) find contrary results for 55 
OECD and non-OECD countries. The effects of international trade on employment could 
also be negative (Sakurai, 2004, for Japan; McMillan and Verduzco, 2011, for Latin 
America), positive (Sen, 2002, for Bangladesh and Kenya; Gaston, 1998, for Australia), or 
hold no relevant (Currie and Harrison, 1997, for Morocco). 
 As settling the debate on trade and wages is far from straightforward, Feenstra and 
Hanson (2001) conclude that existing studies have only begun to scratch the surface of 
how the globalization of production changes industry structure and factor demand in both 
advanced and emerging economies. The paper in Chapter 4, which analyzes the wage and 
employment response to trade liberalization in Vietnam, adds to the body of evidence for 
the case of an emerging country. 
1.2. Research Focus and Design 
 The remaining chapters of this dissertation are as follows. 
 Chapter 2 aims at analyzing how the presence of foreign affiliates in Vietnamese 
manufacturing influences the productivity of domestic firms through horizontal and 
vertical linkages in the period of post-WTO accession, namely 2007-2009. In this paper, a 
firm-level data set from the GSO’s annual enterprise surveys is used, finding that 
productivity spillovers from foreign affiliates in the same and upstream industries are 
negative, but those from foreign firms in downstream industries are positive.  
 To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the role of 
managerial skill, denoted as the educational level of the domestic firm’s director, in driving 
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the spillovers absorptive capacity of domestic firms.  In combination with the role of firm 
ownership, positive horizontal spillovers are found to be associated with local firms that 
are private and/or with high managerial skill. Furthermore, we add to the literature gap by 
focusing on the relationship between sectors (intra-sector and inter-sector linkages). The 
appearance of foreign firms in downstream manufacturing and upstream service sectors 
stimulates the productivity of domestic firms, yet upstream manufacturing and downstream 
service sectors prevent the spillovers. This finding relies on the nature of input linkages 
whereby core manufacturing inputs are more important than service inputs for a domestic 
manufacturing firm and market power whereby a domestic manufacturing firm wields 
different bargaining power when dealing business with a firm in intra-sectors or inter-
sectors. 
 Chapter 3 also uses the same source of data. Based on an unbalanced firm-level 
data set for the Vietnamese manufacturing sector in the period 2007-2010, we highlight the 
role of investors’ nationalities in sourcing different spillovers to domestic firms. In the 
paper, 8 FDI sources are analyzed: China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United States, 
ASEAN, and Europe. We contribute to existing literature by offering the hypothesis that 
within a developing country, those investors from origins who purchase more products in 
low-tech industries can cause better backward spillovers to domestic suppliers. 
Furthermore, the findings support the hypotheses that the share of intermediate inputs 
sourced locally by MNEs from a host country is likely to increase with the distance 
between the host and source economy (Rodrigues-Clare, 1996), and if the host country has 
regional preferential trade agreements with the source country (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 
2011). 
 The hypothesis lies on the background that FDI from a source country could be 
high-tech or low-tech intensive, due to (1) the comparative advantage of the source 
economy, and (2) the demonstration effect from existing investors within the same 
industry. Trade liberalization in the host country is one necessary condition that can 
influence the decision on industry selection, since investors foresee an attractive prospect 
for their business. By contrast, as manufacturing firms in a developing country are 
expected to have comparative advantage in producing low-tech products, domestic 
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suppliers in low-tech industries could better absorb spillovers than those in high-tech 
industries.  
 The fourth chapter is based on a joint paper with Pham Dinh Long and Holger 
Görg. In this study, we combine two sources of data, the GSO and DANIDA’s small and 
medium manufacturing enterprises surveys, to establish panel data sets at both industry and 
firm levels for Vietnamese manufacturing between 2003 and 2008. The analyses provide 
empirical evidence for a negative response of wages and employment at both industry and 
firm levels to trade reforms but the impacts are modest, especially on employment. 
Following the approaches of Revenga (1997) and Ghazali (2011), an explanation for this 
negative relationship is based on the industry wage premium channel which reflects the 
rent sharing between firms and employees. Furthermore, this paper is also interested in 
examining wage gaps associated with gender and skill composition, and the role of unions 
in bargaining rent-sharing at firm level. The findings suggest that although there exist 
wage inequalities between skilled-unskilled and male-female workers, these gaps are 
reduced under trade liberalization. Also, unionization is found to reduce skill earning 
differentials. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 provides some conclusion and an outlook for further research. 
  
9 
 
 
 
2. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PRODUCTIVITY 
SPILLOVER AND THE ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
THROUGH MANAGERIAL SKILL AND OWNERSHIP 
 
Pham Thi Bich Ngoc 
 
This paper is in proceedings of the International Conference on Business, 
Economics and Information Technology in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam (19-20 March 
2012). One of the earlier versions received the award of Turkish Derivatives Exchange in 
Honor of Prof. Refet Saygili for the exceptional paper at the 14th International Student 
Conference in Economics at Ege University, Izmir, Turkey (11-13 May 2011). It was also 
presented at the Brown Bag Workshop (University of Kiel, 06-07 July 2011) and the 
Lunchtime Seminar on International Economics (the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 
4 November 2011) 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) reflects the objective of establishing a lasting 
interest by a resident enterprise in one economy in an enterprise that is resident in another 
economy (OECD, 2008)
1
. In many cases multinational enterprises (MNEs) prefer setting 
up overseas instead of exporting directly and/or licensing their products or technologies 
(Findlay, 1978). Once an MNE sets up an affiliate in a country, it can bring along its 
                                                 
1
 The foreign investor owns 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting power for an incorporated 
enterprise or an unincorporated enterprise in which the foreign investor has equivalent ownership (OECD, 
2008). 
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advanced technology and/or its managerial expertise, possibly causing spillovers to 
domestic firms (Wang and Blomström, 1992)
2
. In addition, host governments often attract 
FDI, expecting positive effects for domestic economic growth, economic structure, 
exports, employment, and especially a positive impact on total factor productivity. A wide 
range of economic literature has dealt with FDI and, apart from investigating direct effects, 
many have discovered FDI spillovers influencing local firms such as wage, export and 
technological spillovers, of which the latter gain most attention
3
.  
 A well-developed literature deals with the FDI productivity spillovers into a 
domestic economy (see Görg and Greenaway, 2004, for a review). Domestic firms may 
improve their productivity when foreign firms enter in the same industry (horizontal/ intra- 
industry spillovers) or in a different industry (vertical/ inter- industry spillovers). The latter 
covers the foreign appearance in an upstream/supplying industry (forward spillovers) and 
in a downstream/buying industry (backward linkages). 
By using an unbalanced firm-level data set for the Vietnamese manufacturing 
sector from 2007 to 2009, this study analyzes how the presence of foreign affiliates 
influences the productivity of domestic firms in manufacturing sector in the period post 
WTO accession. However, we no longer restrict ourselves to detect the spillovers through 
horizontal and vertical linkages but aim at two objectives. 
First, we not only investigate horizontal and vertical spillovers as in the previous 
literature, but also differentiate between vertical spillovers from MNEs in manufacturing 
and service sectors. This enables us to observe intra-sector linkages (manufacturing-to-
manufacturing) and inter-sector linkages (manufacturing-to-service). To our knowledge, 
only Kim and Kim (2010) separate the spillovers from upstream and downstream MNEs 
                                                 
2
 Findlay (1978) measured the spillovers as the ratio of the capital stock of foreign firms in the backward 
economy to the capital stock of the domestic firms. Wang and Blomström (1992) used the technological 
competition between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. Meanwhile, Fosfuriet al. (2001) and Glass and 
Saggi (2002) captured spillovers caused by the movement of labors worked for foreign firms to domestic 
firms. 
3
 For wage spillovers see Driffield and Girma (2003), and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001). For export spillovers 
see Kneller and Pisu (2007), Ruane and Sutherland (2005), and Barrios et al. (2001). 
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by service and manufacturing sectors but they did not explain how different the spillovers 
were. Our study provides evidence that in a more competitive market situation, domestic 
firms could fail to learn from foreign affiliates in the same industries in terms of 
productivity spillovers. The econometric analysis shows that the appearance of foreign 
firms in downstream manufacturing and upstream service sectors stimulates productivity 
of domestic firms, while their appearance in upstream manufacturing and downstream 
service sectors prevents the spillovers.  
Foreign investors in an economy can have effects on suppliers not just in terms of 
the quantities of goods that they purchase, but also through an impact on the quality of 
inputs, and the efficiency with which those inputs are supplied (Dunning, 1993). Domestic 
firms under trade liberalization in the period of the world financial crisis can use 
manufacturing inputs inefficiently but gain from foreign customers. In order to explain the 
manufacturing-to-service linkages, we rely on the nature of input linkages and market 
power. On the one hand, a domestic firm which produces manufacturing products can need 
more inputs from firms in manufacturing industries than those in service sectors. That 
reduces the power of foreign service firms in selling products to domestic manufacturing 
firms. On the other hand, for the case of Vietnam after WTO accession, foreign capital 
flows much more to service sector. The increased competition in the service sector not 
only forces foreign service enterprises to be more careful in making input decisions but 
also pushes them into a weaker position vis-à-vis local customers. Therefore, their 
presence in upstream sectors is expected to transfer spillovers to domestic manufacturing 
firms while their presence in downstream sectors is not. 
Second, this study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to examine the role of 
managerial skill in deciding the spillover absorption of local enterprises. The managerial 
skill is captured by the educational level of firms’ directors. Management refers to skills in 
strategic planning, co-ordination, directing and controlling of large and complex decision-
making processes. So management entails the acquisition of managerial competence, and 
effectiveness in the following key areas: problem solving, administration, human resource 
management, and organizational leadership. Hence, it is expected that a director with better 
management skills is more dynamic to observe and learn new technology and knowledge 
from the foreign affiliates in the same industry. We argue that a firm’s director with higher 
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managerial skill can strongly stimulate the ‘demonstration’, ‘competition’ and ‘labor 
mobility’ channels in order to improve the firm’s productivity.  
Specifically, the aim of our analysis is to analyze the spillover absorption of private 
firms/SOEs with varying managerial skill levels as the state owned enterprises (SOEs) still 
occupy a large proportion in the whole capital sources of the Vietnamese economy. We 
find that domestic private firms with high managerial skill are associated with positive 
horizontal spillovers. 
The structure of this study is as follows. The next section describes patterns of 
inward FDI in the Vietnamese economy generally and in the manufacturing sector 
particularly. Sections 3 and 4 provide literature review and describe the methodology 
respectively. The data and empirical results are then presented in sections 5 and 6. The 
final section provides conclusions. 
2.2. FDI in the Vietnamese Manufacturing 
The economic reform in 1986 set a milestone for Vietnam to change from a 
centrally-planned to a market oriented economy.  Since then, the Vietnamese economy has 
grown rapidly with an average growth rate over 7% per annum, raising GDP per capita 
from US$98 in 1990, up to US$1,052 in 2009 (GSO
4
). In the process of industrialization 
and trade liberalization, Vietnam has been bound with bilateral or multilateral trade 
agreements. Trade policy has been gradually reformed intensively in recent years due to 
the commitments with ASEAN and WTO. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995, 
completed the trade liberalization program under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
January, 2006, and became a member of WTO in 2007. Right after Vietnam joined WTO, 
manufacturing output increased to VND 302 trillion (around US$ 15 million) in 2008, up 
24.3% compared to the previous year. However, the manufacturing sector occupies only 
20.8% of the total capital resources of the whole economy even though it employs 48% of 
total employment (GSO, 2010a).  
Investment policy has also changed to attract more FDI. The Law on FDI was 
firstly passed by the VII National Assembly in 1987, then amended five times in 1990, 
                                                 
4
 The Vietnamese General Statistics Office (www.gso.gov.vn) 
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1992, 1996, 2000, and 2003 and afterwards unified with the Law on Domestic Investment 
to be the Investment Law in 2005 which has been applied since 01/07/2006 in order to 
facilitate a better investment environment for foreign invested firms. The reform process in 
the early stage aimed at permitting the formation of private-foreign joint ventures, export 
and processing zones, and offering systems of tax exemption or tax reduction on profits. At 
the later stage, the amendment allowed FDI to be export oriented. Moreover, its objectives 
are to reduce transaction cost of establishing foreign investment and to ease and simplify 
the process of producing an investment license and gaining registration (Tien, 2008; 
Narjoko, 2009).  
Figure 2.1: Inward FDI in Vietnam, 1991-2009 
 
Source: the GSO (www.gso.vn)  
According to the GSO, annual registered FDI had increased dramatically from 
$0.34 billion in 1988 to $10.16 billion in 1996, but then dropped to $2.57 billion in 1999 
due to the Southeast Asian financial crisis. It then gradually recovered in the following 
years and finally boomed after Vietnam became the WTO’s 150th member in 2007 to reach 
the top at $71.73 billion in 2008, but reduced strongly afterwards. However, it seems that 
the implemented foreign capital has not developed in a similar way. The fraction of 
implemented to registered FDI reached the highest level at 91% in 1999 but fell to the 
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lowest at 16% in 2008. Meanwhile, the number of projects was going up quite steadily 
from the 1990s to 2008 (Figure 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Inward FDI in Manufacturing in the Vietnamese Economy, 2006-2009 
% 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Percentage of total GDP in 
Manufacturing 34.92 34.51 31.04 30.36 
   *except Mining & Quarrying/  
   Electricity, gas, and water supply 21.25 21.26 20.35 20.09 
 
Percentage of total GDP in foreign 
invested sector  16.98 17.96 18.43 18.33 
 
Proportion of inward FDI in process 
manufacturing 68.90 - 45.15 17.06 
 
Inward FDI:     
Number of projects 987 1,544 1,557 1,208 
Registered capital (Mill. US$) 12,004 21,347.8 71,726 23,107.3 
       The growth rate  75.50% 77.84% 235.99% -67.78% 
Implemented capital (Mill. US$) 4,100 8,030 11,500 10,000 
Leading counterparts 
Shares in total FDI 
Korea 
25.9% 
Korea 
25.3% 
Malaysia 
20.87% 
US 
43% 
 
FDI Contribution in:  
    GDP (%) 16.98 17.96 18.43 18.33
Employment (%) 21.52 22.84 22.43 - 
Investment capital (%) 16.20 24.30 30.90 25.50 
Taxation (%) 43.82 35.88 40.44 - 
Source: Author’s collections and calculations based on the GSO’s data. 
Table 2.1 gives some information on manufacturing output and FDI inflows over 
the period 2006-2009. Accordingly, process manufacturing sectors accounted for 20.7% of 
the national GDP per annum. South Korea, Malaysia, United States were in turn the 
leading source countries invested in Vietnam. Although the world financial crisis in 2008 
blew a cold wind to the economy, leaving inflation and recession, foreign enterprises 
operate productively in Vietnam. The fraction of MNEs’ capital resources in the whole 
15 
 
economy was 18 % on average, but the indicator profits before taxes had a quite high share 
of 48.6 % in the period 2006-2008 (GSOa, 2010). The FDI sector accounted for 18% of 
GDP, 40% of tax and 22% annually of total employment. 
While Vietnam witnessed a strong increase in total FDI inflows in this period, the 
proportion of FDI in process manufacturing sectors strongly decreased from 69% in 2006 
to 17% in 2009. This downward trend was contrasted by an upward trend in FDI flows to 
service sectors (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Shares of Inward FDI by Sector 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSO’s data. 
In fact, the registered foreign capital in manufacturing grew from US$ 8.4 trillion 
in 2006 up to US$ 35.7 trillion in 2008. However, the growth was lower than that in 
service sectors. Foreign investors concentrated on industries of Real Estate, Renting 
Business Activity (e.g. US$ 23.7 trillion in 2008, accounted for 37% in total FDI flows); 
then Transport, Storage, and Communication (US$ 1.99 trillion; 3%) and Hotel and 
Restaurants (US$ 1.4 trillion; 2.1%). The growth rates in these industries were 1,203%, 
3,499%, and 171% respectively. FDI inflows in manufacturing sectors then decreased 
nearly 8 fold in 2009, compared to 1.5 fold in service sectors. It is possible that the world 
financial crisis directly brought difficulties to MNEs, especially foreign affiliates in 
manufacturing. Moreover, some macroeconomic problems in the Vietnamese economy 
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(for example, inflation increased from 8.3% in 2007 to 23% in 2008), might negatively 
influence the business of all enterprises. 
2.3. Theoretical and Literature Review 
 Productivity spillovers from foreign affiliates to domestic enterprises can go 
through horizontal and vertical linkages.  
 Horizontal spillovers can occur through several different channels: demonstration 
effects, competition effects, and labor mobility effects. Domestic firms can observe foreign 
firm’s actions, skills or techniques and make efforts to imitate/acquire these techniques and 
apply them, which results in productivity improvements (demonstration effects). 
Furthermore, MNEs possess productive assets, such as know-how, marketing and 
managing skills, reputation. Thus, to stay competitive, domestic firms are forced to operate 
more efficiently and adopt new technologies (competition effects). Also, domestic firms 
may benefit from employing workers and managers who have been trained with advanced 
technical and managerial skills in foreign affiliates (labor mobility effects)(Kokko, 1996; 
Wang and Blomström, 1992; Glass and Saggi, 2002). A foreign presence could cause the 
domestic sector to develop with wider beneficial effects in the host region or industry 
(Markusen and Venables, 1999). Linkages between foreign and domestic firms can boost 
productivity of the domestic sector (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). 
 However, it is difficult to explain negative horizontal spillovers based on these 
effects. When finding negative results for the Venezuelan firms, Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) argue that the foreign presence could reduce productivity of domestic firms, 
particularly in the short run. Foreign firm entry can draw demand from domestic firms, 
causing them to cut production. This channel is referred to as the market stealing effects 
(Anh et al., 2008; Driffield and Love, 2006). Foreign firms with an advanced technology 
and know-how may lead the market and make domestic firms produce at a less efficient 
scale, which force them to lower productivity. Therefore, whether the horizontal spillovers 
are positive or negative depends on which effects prevail. 
 Vertical spillovers occur through forward and backward linkages. Referring to the 
backward linkage, Javorcik (2004) suggests that the supplier-buyer linkage can take place 
through (i) direct knowledge transfer from foreign customers to local suppliers; (ii) higher 
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requirements for product quality and on-time delivery introduced by multinationals which 
provide incentives to domestic suppliers to upgrade their production management or 
technology; and (iii) increased demand for intermediate products, which allows local 
suppliers to reap the benefits of scale economies. In the manufacturing environment in 
particular, foreign manufacturers can act in ways that improve the technical capability of 
their domestic suppliers, for example, in terms of design, procurement, market information 
and tooling, and in promoting quality and efficiency improvements (Munday et al., 1995). 
Nevertheless, the spillovers depend on the nature of the relationship between 
multinationals and domestic firms, being present in issues such as bargaining power, or 
agency problems (Driffield, Munday and Roberts, 2002; Goldsmith and Sporleder, 1998). 
For instance, long term contracts with a reduced number of suppliers provides increased 
scope for the spillovers, particularly where a foreign party possesses a set of ownership 
advantages embodied in specific assets, technology and knowledge (Dunning, 1993; Imrie 
and Morris, 1992). The existence of production spillovers from the foreign owned sector 
may not always be reflected in productivity of the domestic supplier sector. The spillovers 
depend on the nature of the foreign subsidiary, the freedom of local management teams to 
direct purchasing decisions, degree of vertical integration, the mix of components and 
materials bought locally (Angle, 1994; Driffield, Munday and Roberts, 2002). 
A forward linkage takes place when domestic firms become more productive as a 
result of gaining access to new, improved or less costly intermediate inputs produced by 
multinationals in upstream sectors. Sales of these inputs by multinationals may be 
accompanied by provision of complementary services that may not be available in 
connection with imports (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Javorcik, 2004). Entry by foreign 
multinationals may change market concentration and increasing competition in the 
domestic economy (Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996). Thus, domestic firms in downstream 
industries may be in a stronger bargaining position than those in upstream industries and 
benefit more from greater competence and technology of foreign affiliates. However, we 
should consider whether the foreign suppliers are domestic- or export- oriented and 
whether domestic firms are able to exploit high technology inputs. Scale and scope of 
spillovers depend on the actions of the inward investors, and the ability of the domestic 
sector to assimilate the imported technology (Driffield, 2001a). 
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In practice, spillovers from FDI are more likely to be vertical than horizontal since 
MNEs have incentives to prevent information leakage that would enhance the performance 
of their local competitors but at the same time may benefit from transferring knowledge  to 
their local suppliers (Javorcik, 2004). MNEs can use ways of protection such as intellectual 
property, trade secrecy, paying higher wages to prevent labor turnover or locating in 
countries or industries where domestic firms have limited imitative capacities to begin with 
(Görg and Greenaway, 2004). 
A wide range of empirical works have investigated the spillovers of inward FDI. 
Görg and Greenaway (2004) review findings of 45 cases on horizontal and/or vertical 
productivity spillover of FDI into host developed, transition, and developing economies in 
the period 1966-2000. In general, developing economies could suffer negative productivity 
spillover but mostly absorb positive spillovers from the appearance of foreign firms in the 
same industries. Backward productivity spillovers were found to be positive in Lithuania 
by Javorcik (2004) but negative in Zambia by Bwalya (2006). For the case of Vietnam, 
there exist several empirical studies which investigate the technological spillovers via 
horizontal, forward and backward linkages, focusing on the period 2000 to 2005 (Thuy, 
2005; Le and Pomfret, 2008; Anh et al., 2008; Chuc et al., 2008; Lan, 2008). In contrast to 
the other mentioned studies, Lan (2008) deals explicitly with endogeneity, finding 
deviating effects of horizontal and forward spillovers but still similar backward effects. 
The author finds that the productivity of domestic Vietnamese manufacturing firms can be 
boosted by the presence of foreign affiliates in the same industries and in downstream 
sectors but reduced by their appearance in upstream sectors. 
The mixed results of spillovers may, to some extent, be explained by differences in 
the level of absorptive capacity of domestic firms (Cantwell, 1989). Domestic firms do not 
benefit equally from the knowledge spillovers of foreign affiliates. According to Ben 
Hamida (2006), a firm’s absorptive capacity depends upon its existing level of 
technological competence as well as its learning and investment efforts in order to acquire 
foreign knowledge. In particular, a larger technology gap can lower technological 
spillovers (Kokko, 1996; Glass and Saggi, 1998). Local exporters are more likely to 
benefit from positive spillovers than non-exporters (Barrios and Strobl, 2002; Girma, 
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Görg, and Pisu, 2008). R&D intensive local firms also absorb the spillovers better 
(Kinoshita, 2001).  
Accordingly, Javorcik (2004) finds positive backward spillovers associated with 
projects with shared domestic and foreign ownership but not with fully owned foreign 
investment. Lan (2008) concludes that the Vietnamese firms with higher human capital 
stock, better financial development and lower technology gap could benefit from 
technological spillovers in the period 2000-2005. Meanwhile, Kim and Kim (2010) show 
that the presence of foreign firms in both downstream manufacturing and service sectors 
positively affects the productivity of the Korean manufacturing firms in the period from 
2001 to 2008. They also stressed the importance of attracting FDI to the service sector as it 
results in a greater spillover effect than in other sectors. 
Overall, although no aforementioned literature have directly suggested the role of 
managerial skills in driving FDI spillover absorption, this issue could be based on the 
framework: (1) a firm’s absorptive capacity could depend on its characteristics (e.g. 
managerial skill); (2) As management is associated with the effectiveness in areas of 
administration, human resource management, and organizational leadership; a director 
with better management skills is expected to observe, to learn and adopt new technology 
and knowledge from foreign affiliates (demonstration effects, competition effects). He can 
stimulate and exploit the labor force moved from foreign affiliates (labor mobility effects). 
Moreover, he may have the ability to upgrade the bargaining power in dealing business 
with foreign partners. 
2.4. Research Methodology and Estimation Strategy 
The study utilizes an augmented three factor Cobb-Douglas production function:  
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Yijrt_ the output, represented by the total sales of firm i operating in sector j in 
region r at time t.
5
 Kijrt_ the capital of firm i, defined as the value of fixed assets at the 
beginning of the year. Mijrt_ Material inputs, calculated by total expenditure, minus total 
wages of firm i. Yijrt, Kijrt, Mijrt are all deflated to be at the base price in 2007 by using the 
Products Price Indexes of process manufacturing sectors; unit: VND million. Lijrt_ the 
measure of labor defined by the number of employees of firm i in sector j in region r at the 
beginning of year t.
6 
Spillover effects are measured by the impact of foreign presence on the output 
level of domestic firms, controlling for inputs (Javorcik, 2004)
7
. We follow Javorcik 
(2004) and calculate the following spillovers variables (Appendix A.1): 
Horizontal jt: captures the presence of foreign firms in sector j at time t, defined by 
the foreign equity participation averaged over all firms in the sector, weighted by each 
firm’s share in sectoral output:  
    
∑                       
∑        
 
Backward jt: Proxy for the foreign presence in the industries that are being supplied 
by sector j (downstream industries), separated into manufacturing and service sectors
8
. 
                                                 
5
 All other studies for the case of Vietnam with the same data source (GSO) used ‘real output’ as the 
dependent variable. We argue that ‘firm sales’ is the best choice because (1) there could be false information 
of real output as this indicator is asked to give the right values at the base year 1994, (2) there are too many 
missing values of ‘real output’ in the period, and (3) using ‘value added’ instead, we will remove all 
negative-profit firms when taking log for both sides of the Cobb- Douglas function. 
6
 This approach has limitation because it is impossible to distinguish the skilled and unskilled workers. 
Javorcik (2004) and Tybout et al.(1991) used labor expressed in terms of efficiency units, which are 
computed by dividing the wage bill by the medium wage. 
7
 Ben Hamida (2006) argued that this way seems to be an appropriate measure for spillover effects through 
demonstration but not enough for competition and worker mobility effects. 
8
 Kim and Kim (2010) applied directly the approach of Javorcik (2004) for calculating of primary/ 
manufacturing/ service backward and forward, but they did not expand the formula. 
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Ajk is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to sector k, taken directly from the 
Input-Output (I/O) table (2007). We assume the outputs coefficients (ajk)s are unchanged 
over time. 
Forwardjt: Proxy for the foreign presence in the supplying industries to sector j 
(upstream industries), separated into manufacturing and service sectors. 
 
jm is the share of inputs purchased by industry j from industry m in total inputs 
sourced by sector j, taken directly from I/O table (2007). We also assume the inputs 
coefficients (jm)s are unchanged over time. 
Xit is the exports of firm i at time t. There is no information of exports from the 
surveys. One previous research for the case of Vietnam assumes that proportion of foreign 
export within a sector is linearly correlated with the equity share of foreign firms (Anh et 
al., 2008). Since this assumption seems not to be so convincing, we see instead that the 
difference between total output and export of firm i is domestic sales. 
                        
Domestic sales, which are not available in the data, can be replaced by value added 
tax (VAT) of domestic goods divided by the tax rate at 10 %.  
Furthermore, this study controls for additional variables (beyond FDI) that may 
influence in the firms’ productivities, such as the demand for intermediates and the level of 
industry concentration. 
        𝑗 =   𝑗 
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demandjt: demand for intermediates (as in Javorcik, 2004).  We expect a positive 
relation between demand and firm productivity. 
             
 
     
ajkis the I/O coefficient indicating the proportion of good j used to produce one unit 
of good k. 
concentrationjt: the Herfindahl index representing the level of industry 
concentration (as in Lan, 2008; Le and Promfet, 2008). An increasing index indicates less 
competition in the industry. This may either lead to less productivity improvement due to 
lower competitive pressure or to more productivity growth if firms are able to exploit 
increasing return of scale.  
 
We estimate the equation for (1) the whole set of domestic firms, and (2) separately 
for SOEs and private enterprises with low/high managerial skills respectively. The 
variables backward and forward are included in their decomposed forms, i.e. for service 
and manufacturing sectors separately. 
We apply OLS, controlling for industry, time, and regional fixed effects; within 
group (firm fixed effects); and system GMM estimators. Standard errors are robustly 
adjusted to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Without independently and 
identically distributed error terms, the OLS estimator could be inconsistent because of the 
omission of unobserved factors such as different skills of employees, different level of 
management or different authority’s capacity in different location which may affect the 
correlation between firm productivity and the presence of foreign enterprises. Moreover, 
the industry specific variables used in the model may lead to standard errors from OLS 
being underestimated. Therefore, the standard errors are corrected to be clustered for all 
observations in the same industry, year, and province. The fixed effects estimator can 
solve time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, but not all potential unobserved 
endogeneity. For a production function, time varying unobservables could be correlated 
with the factors input (capital, labor) because the decisions on inputs are able to be 
             𝑗 =   
𝑦 𝑗 
  𝑗 
 
2 
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observed by managers, leading to inconsistent estimates. Measurement errors represent 
one more source of additional endogeneity (Söderbom, 2009). Therefore, we apply system 
GMM using differences and lagged levels of the inputs as instruments
9
.  
We apply a Hansen test for joint validity of the instruments.
10
 The autocorrelation 
test proposed by Arellano and Bond is to test the serial correlation in the idiosyncratic 
disturbance term. Two-step GMM is applied using the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample 
correction of the reported standard errors, without which those standard errors tend to be 
severely downward biased. We also ‘collapse’ the instrument set in confronting the 
problem of too many instruments
11
. 
2.5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The firm data used in this study comes from the annual enterprise censuses 
conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam for the period 2007 to 2009. The 
GSO has surveyed 100% of state-owned enterprises and all non-state firms. The number of 
enterprises increases from 155,771 in 2007 to 233,236 in 2009, covering almost all 
enterprises in agriculture, forestry and fishery, service and manufacturing sectors. The 
database contains information on the ownership structure of enterprises, value of output, 
number of employees, wages, sales, R&D activities, environmental protection activities, 
etc. Information on the educational level of firm directors is only available in 2 years 2008 
and 2009. According to Vietnam Standard Industrial Classifications (VSIC, 1993), there 
are 29 manufacturing sectors including 23 process manufacturing, 4 mining and quarrying, 
and 2 sectors in electricity, gas and water supply. Only information of firms in 22 process 
                                                 
9
 System GMM is more consistent than Difference GMM in case endogeneity variables are close to a random 
walk, then the past levels (instruments of Difference GMM) convey little information about future changes 
(Roodman, 2006).  
10
 If non-sphericity is suspected in the errors, as in robust one-step GMM, the Sargan test is inconsistent. In 
that case, a theoretical superior overidentification test for the one-step estimator is based on the Hansen 
statistic from a two-step estimate (Roodman, 2006). We apply the Hansen test in the study, as in Girma, 
Görg, and Pisu (2008) and Kim and Kim (2010). 
11
 System GMM uses instruments as difference with levels. These instruments set could be collapsed into a 
single column. This embodies the same expectation but conveys slightly less information.  
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manufacturing sectors will be applied, excluding the Recycling sector where there is no 
foreign presence in the sample (Appendix A.2). 
The I/O table is provided by the GSO in 2007 which is the most recent with the 
dimension of 138 categories in order to calculate the forward and backward linkages. The 
I/O table gives input coefficients relating to production technology applied to create 
products, gross capital formation, final consumptions and exports, and some other 
indicators.  
The sample used in this study originates from an unbalanced panel data set which 
consists of 114,342 manufacturing observations, then further reduced to 77,308 
observations after controlling for missing and zero values of firm sales, capital and 
employment. To observe a continuous affect, we generate a balanced panel data set 
including 23,850 observations of which 3,960 observations (equivalent to 16.6% of the 
whole) are foreign owned. Foreign invested enterprises include wholly foreign owned 
companies, joint ventures between SOEs or non-state companies and foreign partners. 
Based on the sample of firms in manufacturing, we can calculate the foreign presence in 
upstream and downstream manufacturing industries. In order to measure the foreign 
presence in upstream and downstream service sectors, we use a balanced panel data set for 
11 service sectors which comprise 1,294 foreign owned and 94,457 domestically owned 
firms.
12
 
Table 2.2 introduces some summary statistics of foreign firms and domestic firms 
which are separated by firm ownership and managerial skill. SOEs include central and 
local SOEs or state limited companies, and joint-stock companies with the share of state 
capital higher than 50%. The privates/ non-states enterprises cover collectives, private 
enterprises or limited companies, partnership companies, joint- stock companies without 
state capital or with state capital less than 50%. A domestic firm whose director hasa 
Bachelor degree or higher is denoted as having high managerial skill levels. 
                                                 
12
 There are 11 service industries in this sample: (1) Construction, (2) Wholesale And Retail Trade, Repair Of 
Motor Vehicles, (3) Hotels And Restaurants, (4) Transport, Storage And Communications; (5) Financial 
Intermediation, (6) Science And Technology Activities, (7) Real Estate, Renting And Business Activities, (8) 
Education; (9) Health And Social Work; (10) Cultural And Sport Activities, and (11) Others. 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics, 2007-2009 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
Foreign firms (3,960 obs.): 
 
Domestic firms (19,890 obs.): 
Log sales 10.832 1.750  Log sales 9.009 1.912 
Log capital 9.545 1.865  Log capital 7.390 2.004 
Log labor 5.192 1.473  Log labor 3.856 1.426 
Log materials 10.547 1.842  Log materials 8.720 2.051 
Log demand 17.062 .821  Log demand 17.180 .871 
Concentration .037 .047  Concentration .028 .037 
 
For domestic firms: 
    
-    Non state enterprises (18,571 obs.) -   State owned enterprises (1,319 obs.) 
Log sales 8.837 1.814  Log sales 11.427 1.591 
Log capital 7.205 1.895  Log capital 9.993 1.656 
Log labor 3.722 1.346  Log labor 5.750 1.142 
Log materials 8.548 1.964  Log materials 11.143 1.679 
 
-   With low managerial skill (5,761 obs., 
including 5,370 obs. of private firms and 
18 obs. of SOEs )* 
 
-   With high managerial skill (8,283 obs., 
including 5,191obs. of private firms and 825 obs. of 
SOEs)* 
Log sales 8.478 1.736  Log sales 10.198 1.898 
Log capital 6.921 1.773  Log capital 8.664 2.067 
Log labor 3.561 1.180  Log labor 4.803 1.449 
Log materials 8.145 1.940  Log materials 9.866 2.037 
 
Horizontal 
 
.387 
 
.138 
  
Backward_manufacturing 
 
.106 
 
.097 
Backward .120 .096  Backward_service .013 .016 
Forward .130 .068  Forward_manufacturing .122 .068 
    Forward_service .007 .003 
* Data for managerial skill is only available in 2008- 2009 
As can be seen, capital, employment and sales of a foreign enterprise are 
respectively 29%, 35% and 20% higher than those of a local firm. Domestic firms which 
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are state owned, or at higher managerial skill have larger sizes in term of sales, capital, 
labor, and materials than other domestic firms. The average presence of foreign affiliates in 
the same manufacturing industry is 38%, and 12% and 13% in downstream and upstream 
industries respectively. Thus, it is possible that foreign invested enterprises tend to import 
material inputs and export their products rather than using domestic products. The foreign 
presence in manufacturing sectors is much higher than in service sectors.  
When classifying domestic firms by ownership, SOEs account for just 6.6% of all 
observations but represent 47.2% of total capital and 25.2% of total employment. These 
firms employ mostly highly educated directors (825 cases compared to 18 cases with low 
managerial skill). By contrast, the number of high managerial skill directors in the private 
sector is equivalent to that of low managerial skill directors. Overall, enterprises with high 
managerial skill possess higher capital, labor, and raw materials and achieve higher sales.  
2.6. Empirical Result and Analysis 
2.6.1. Productivity spillovers through intra-sector and inter-sector linkages 
Table 2.3 shows FDI productivity spillovers to domestic manufacturing firms 
through horizontal, backward and forward linkages in the period 2007-2009. The vertical 
linkages are separated into linkages with manufacturing and service sectors.  The OLS 
estimation is presented in column 1. Columns 2 reports firm fixed effect estimations. Both 
estimations show significant positive spillovers from foreign firms through horizontal 
linkages but negative spillovers through backward and forward linkages.  
Table 2.3:  Productivity Spillovers through Linkages, 2007-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS level Within SYS SYS 
     
Log capital 0.0180*** 0.0150*** 0.278*** 0.279*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00362) (0.0850) (0.0821) 
Log labor 0.187*** 0.126*** 0.601*** 0.568*** 
 (0.00479) (0.00755) (0.0938) (0.0903) 
Log materials 0.813*** 0.707*** 0.156*** 0.197*** 
 (0.00456) (0.00977) (0.0541) (0.0511) 
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Horizontal 0.314*** 0.287*** -0.132 -0.711*** 
 (0.0910) (0.0860) (0.121) (0.137) 
Backward -0.749*** -0.760*** 0.581***  
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.171)  
Backward_     0.541*** 
Manufacturing    (0.182) 
Backward_    -6.812*** 
Service    (0.774) 
  
   
Forward -0.774*** -0.541*** -0.773***  
 (0.195) (0.174) (0.239)  
Forward_    -0.687*** 
Manufacturing    (0.233) 
Forward_     19.33*** 
Service    (4.644) 
     
Log demand -0.0695 0.00676 0.151*** 0.0891*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0589) (0.0319) (0.0307) 
Concentration -0.521 -0.817** 2.563*** 2.654*** 
 (0.353) (0.361) (0.732) (0.708) 
Constant 2.232** 1.898* 36.84** 86.25*** 
 (1.116) (1.047) (15.74) (22.22) 
R-squared 0.981 0.829   
AR(1)   0.000 0.000 
Hansen test   0.174 0.271 
Observations 19,890 19,890 19,890 19,890 
(i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(ii) (***), (**), and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
(iii) Columns (1) and (2) estimates include sector, year, and province dummies. 
(iv) Columns (3) and (4) use GMM instruments log capital and log labor by 2 years for first 
differences equation and collapsed. 
Columns 3 and 4 are for two-step system GMM estimates using capital and labor 
lagged by 2 years and the corresponding first differences as instruments. Robust standard 
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errors are corrected for finite sample bias. Hansen tests show p-values which are more than 
5 percent so we can conclude that these instruments are valid. Assuming that errors are 
uncorrelated across firms, we reject the null of no serial correlation because p-values of the 
autocorrelation test are less than 5 percent. The analysis is based on the results of the 
system GMM estimators.  
The results show that productivity of domestic firms is negatively correlated with 
the presence of foreign affiliates in the same sector and in upstream sectors, but positively 
correlated with foreign affiliates’ presence in downstream sectors. The presence of positive 
backward spillovers suggests that the demand from foreign customers is one important 
source to stimulate productivity improvement of domestic suppliers, in line with Javorcik 
(2004). The finding of negative horizontal spillovers when separating backward and 
forward spillovers into manufacturing and service sectors stands in contrast to the results 
from OLS and within-group estimation in the first two columns. This suggests that input 
endogeneity issues can distort the true effects
13
. In detail, one standard unit increase in 
foreign presence which is equivalent to 1% increase in foreign sales in intra-industries 
causes a 0.71% decrease in productivity of domestic firms.  
In addition, this result stands also in contrast to the finding of Lan (2008) for the 
case of Vietnam in the period 2000-2005. His study provided evidence of positive 
horizontal and backward spillovers but negative forward spillovers. The differences in the 
results may possibly be explained by the fact that the positive effects through competition, 
demonstration, and labor mobility were not strong enough to surpass the negative market 
stealing effects in the period post WTO accession. This seems plausible as Vietnamese 
enterprises confronted both a huge surge in foreign firm entry and the world financial crisis 
in this period. Also, foreign affiliates may have been more successful in preventing the 
leakage of technology and know-how to domestic competitors in this period.  
The presence of significant negative forward spillovers is far from easy to explain. 
This may reflect three things. First, the inputs bought from foreign suppliers are possibly 
                                                 
13
 Lan (2008), after controlling input endogeneity by applying 2SLS, also found reversed results of horizontal 
and forward spillovers to indigenous manufacturing firms compared to the results in Anh et al. (2008), Chuc 
et al. (2008). 
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more expensive, causing increasing costs. Second, the local firms could have less ability to 
make use of costly inputs. Third, it could be that indigenous firms would be at a weaker 
position in making contracts with the foreign suppliers.  
Taking intra-sector and inter-sector linkages into account, a one percent increase in 
the presence of foreign suppliers in manufacturing sectors causes a 0.69% reduction in a 
domestic firm’s sales, but the same ratio of foreign suppliers in service sectors triggers a 
19.3% gain in firm productivity. This is possibly due to the large surge in foreign firm 
entry in the period 2007-2009, which may have placed foreign firms in the service sector in 
tougher competition, thus reducing their bargaining power compared to foreign firms in 
manufacturing sectors. Indeed, the coefficients in the I/O table show that, manufacturing 
firms use high proportions of services from industries of “Transport, Storage, and 
Communication” and “Real Estate, Renting Business Activity” whose FDI growth rates 
were 3,499% and 1,203% respectively in 2008. An unavoidable competitive environment 
can lead to price reduction which strongly impact on productivity of customers. In 
addition, firms in service sectors may have been more willing to transfer knowledge to 
manufacturing local buyers, given that they would not perceive them as direct competitors. 
By contrast, we still find negative forward spillovers through intra-sector linkages 
(manufacturing-to-manufacturing) as before. One possible explanation for this is that 
MNEs in upstream manufacturing sectors are mostly export-oriented
14
, which makes them 
less dependent on the sales to local firms. Additionally, domestic firms in the 
manufacturing sector heavily depend on inputs from suppliers in this sector. As argued 
above, this may place the domestic firms in a bad bargaining position, which may lead to 
higher input prices and, consequently, lower productivity.  
The results further show evidence of positive manufacturing-to-manufacturing 
backward spillovers but negative manufacturing-to-service backward effects. A one 
percent increase in the presence of manufacturing foreign buyers produces a 0.54 % rise in 
the output of domestic enterprises. This suggests that, foreign manufacturers, creating a 
reasonable contact with their local suppliers via business contracts or relationship, canto 
                                                 
14
 Exports of the FDI sector accounted 55% of total exports in the period 2007-2009 (GSO, 2011). 
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some extent improve the technical capability of the domestic suppliers. Such 
improvements may take the form of, for example, design, procurement, market information 
and tooling, and in promoting quality and efficiency improvements, as highlighted by 
Munday et al. (1995). 
The negative backward spillovers through inter-sector linkages could be explained 
as follows. We argue that in the context of the type/sophistication of the product which is 
being manufactured, inputs from manufacturing sectors are non-core, hence, less important 
to a foreign firm in the service industry, leading to reduced bargaining power of domestic 
firms in manufacturing. Furthermore, when operating in a competitive environment, MNEs 
in service sectors can be very careful in making their input purchasing decisions.
15
 The 
spillovers may depend on the freedom of local management teams to direct purchasing 
decisions, and the bargaining power of these foreign affiliates (Driffield, Munday and 
Roberts, 2002). 
No longer stopping at finding sign and magnitude of horizontal and vertical 
spillovers, we try to figure out the real productivity effects to the Vietnamese 
manufacturing firms based on evidence of foreign presence in this period. As can be seen 
from the sample, foreign presence increases by 1.4% in the same industries (horizontal), 
0.9% in downstream manufacturing industries (backward_manufacturing), and 0.23% in 
upstream service industries (forward_service); but reduces by 0.3% in downstream service 
industries (backward_service), and 2.1% in upstream manufacturing industries 
(forward_manufacturing). As a rough estimate of the total productivity spillovers to the 
Vietnamese manufacturing, we sum up all spillover coefficients given in Column 4. From 
that we can conclude that the productivity of a Vietnamese manufacturing firm in the 
period 2007-2009 went up by 8.3 % via vertical linkages but down by 1.02% via horizontal 
linkages. 
  
                                                 
15
 FDI inflows in service sectors is equivalent to those in manufacturing sectors in 2008 but 4.7 times higher 
in the following year (GSO) 
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2.6.2. Productivity spillovers by managerial skill and ownership 
Table 2.4 presents horizontal and vertical spillovers to domestics firms, 
distinguishing SOEs and private enterprises with low/high managerial skills in the period 
2008-2009.We use fixed effects estimators.
16
We do not include the case of SOEs with low 
managerial skill due to limited observations. Columns 1 through 3 show the results for 
firms with low managerial skill level while columns 4 through 7 present the findings for 
firms with high managerial skill level.  
For the case of low managerial skills, negative backward and forward spillovers are 
found, while horizontal spillovers are statistically insignificant. Thus, domestic firms 
managed by lowly educated directors cannot learn from FDI entry in the same industries 
and experience reductions in productivity through inter-industry linkages. On the contrary, 
the evidence suggests that local enterprises with high managerial skills can take advantage 
of the foreign presence in the same industries. Private firms could be more dynamic than 
SOEs so that they push up their output through competition, demonstration or labor 
movement effects.
17
As expected, a higher skilled director (with higher education 
attainment), is more capable of observing and learning new technology and knowledge 
from the foreign competitors. He may make good decisions in keeping and stimulating 
high-skilled labor.  
Table 2.4:  Productivity Spillovers by Managerial Skill and Ownership, 2008-2009 
 Low Managerial Skill High Managerial Skill 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables Domestic 
firms 
Domestic 
firms 
Private 
firms 
Domestic 
firms 
Domestic 
firms 
Private  
firms 
SOEs 
        
Log capital 0.0246* 0.0251* 0.0250* 0.000840 0.00209 -0.000973 -0.0123 
                                                 
16
 Since we only have two years of data, it is impossible to implement a GMM approach as applied in Table 
3.  
17
 Girma, Gong, and Görg (2008) found that access to finance play no role in generating FDI spillovers to 
Chinese SOEs as these enterprises are largely inefficient but enjoy preferential access to domestic financial 
resources.  
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 (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0114) (0.0154) 
Log labor 0.0878*** 0.0876*** 0.0874*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.132*** 0.0549 
 (0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0209) (0.0417) 
Log materials 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.600*** 0.600*** 0.595*** 0.650*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0235) (0.0653) 
        
Horizontal 0.379 0.199 0.178 0.497*** 0.499*** 0.473*** 0.280 
 (0.251) (0.260) (0.261) (0.150) (0.154) (0.180) (0.271) 
Backward -2.369***   -1.245**    
 (0.578)   (0.512)    
Forward -2.828***   -0.268    
 (0.471)   (0.297)    
 
Backward_ 
  
-2.709*** 
 
-2.721*** 
  
-0.465 
 
-0.802 
 
2.392** 
Manufacturing   (0.635) (0.636)  (0.544) (0.600) (0.983) 
Backward_  -1.721 -1.834  -6.942*** -8.327*** -6.481*** 
Service  (3.557) (3.563)  (1.709) (2.446) (2.034) 
Forward_  -3.109*** -3.118***  -0.0770 0.156 -0.843 
 manufacturing  (0.502) (0.504)  (0.316) (0.369) (0.707) 
Forward_  28.32 29.77  28.87 22.21 98.82 
Service  (24.73) (24.84)  (20.48) (22.09) (63.12) 
        
Log demand 0.103 0.224 0.214 -0.138 -0.698*** -1.010*** 0.0732 
 (0.153) (0.439) (0.439) (0.137) (0.221) (0.322) (0.219) 
Concentration -5.082** -4.726* -4.471* -1.669 -0.437 0.436 0.133 
 (2.218) (2.526) (2.558) (1.022) (1.055) (1.486) (1.224) 
Constant 0.125 -2.325 -2.119 5.746** 15.67*** 21.57*** 1.598 
 (2.792) (7.934) (7.931) (2.481) (4.053) (5.909) (3.865) 
        
R-squared 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.746 0.747 0.739 0.801 
Observations 5,388 5,388 5,370 6,016 6,016 5,191 825 
(i) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
(ii) (***), (**), and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
(iii) All estimates include sector, year, and province dummies. 
(iv) Columns (1) through (3) are for firms with low managerial skill, in which SOEs are 
excluded due to small number of observations 
(v) Columns (4) through (7) are for firms with high managerial skill. 
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Domestic firms with high managerial skill including privates and SOEs still 
experience negative backward spillovers. However, a higher foreign presence in 
manufacturing downstream industries raises output of SOE. It is possible that SOEs, which 
are on average larger than private firms wield higher bargaining power when selling 
products to foreign customers or they can set up a special relationship with foreign 
affiliates.                 
2.7. Conclusion 
As a developing country, Vietnam has made changes to its trade and investment 
policies to attract FDI, hoping that this would create employment and lead to spillovers of 
the foreign firms’ advanced technologies to the domestic economy. This study investigates 
productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms in manufacturing sectors in the period 
2007-2009. We show that, overall, there are negative horizontal and forward technological 
spillovers but positive backward spillovers. Hence, compared to the findings of Lan 
(2008), we find that Vietnam, at the beginning of its integration process in the world trade 
by completing AFTA commitments in 2006 and participating in the WTO in 2007, has not 
benefitted from FDI inflows in term of productivity improvement through intra-industry 
linkages.  
When analyzing spillovers by firm ownership and managerial skill level, this study 
provides evidence of positive horizontal spillovers for private firms with skilled managers 
and also positive backward spillovers for SOEs with skilled managers through 
manufacturing-to-manufacturing linkages. Meanwhile, firms with low skilled managers do 
not benefit from FDI through either of the spillover channels. Thus, these findings leave 
two messages: (1) private enterprises should aim at raising skill levels of managers in order 
to exploit the FDI spillovers, and (2) even with the same high managerial level, private 
firms are found to be more dynamic than SOEs. Therefore, privatizing SOEs is a good 
policy of the Vietnamese government so as to upgrade the spillover absorptive capacity. 
Furthermore, we make a contribution to the existing literature by taking into 
consideration the intra-sector and inter-sector linkages in investigating vertical spillovers. 
Different types of spillovers are explained based on characteristics of manufacturing 
production and the bargaining power between sellers and buyers. With a rough estimate for 
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FDI spillovers, we find that although the productivity of an average Vietnamese 
manufacturing firm suffers a 1.02% productivity loss due to the negative effect of intra-
industry linkages, it gains circa 8.3% on the basis of inter-industry linkages. This means 
that, overall, domestic firms actively exploit vertical linkages to improve their productivity 
by the way that they limit buying inputs or selling outputs to foreign affiliates who wield 
the potential of negative spillovers, and increase buying inputs or selling outputs to those 
who can bring positive spillovers. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is attracted by developing countries in hope for 
more capital for their economic development and stimulating the technological progress in 
the host countries. FDI may be used as a vehicle for increasing productivity growth (Bitzer 
and Görg, 2009). FDI can bring newer technology transfer to developing countries than 
licensing (Mansfield and Romeo, 1980). In addition, it possibly improves the knowledge 
and skills of managers or workers, and enhances efficiency and productivity in production 
and performance. However, by possessing better production technology, managerial skills, 
export contacts, reputation and good will, FDI is able to force local enterprises to strive in 
a strong competitive environment and can draw demand from domestic firms (Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999). 
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 There has been a well-developed theoretical literature related to FDI spillovers into 
domestic firms. Once a multinational enterprise (MNE) has established a subsidiary, they 
are likely to bring along more sophisticated technology, marketing and managerial 
practices which are possibly spilled over to the domestic firms through the channels: 
imitation, skills acquisition, competition and exports (Wang and Blomström, 1992; Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999). Spillovers possibly derive from MNEs which enter in the same 
industry (horizontal/ intra-industry spillovers) or in a different industry (vertical/ inter-
industry spillovers). The latter covers forward spillovers from MNEs in 
upstream/supplying industries or backward linkages from those in downstream/buying 
industries. Horizontal productivity spillovers can occur through the channels: 
demonstration, competition, labor mobility, and market stealing effects (Wang and 
Blomström, 1992, Kokko, 1996, Glass and Saggi, 2002).  
 In nature, spillovers from FDI are more likely to be vertical than horizontal because 
MNEs can use ways of protection such as intellectual property, trade secrecy, paying 
higher wages to prevent labor turnover or locating in countries or industries where 
domestic firms have limited imitative capacities to begin with (Görg and Greenaway, 
2004; Javorcik, 2004). For backward linkages
18
, MNEs play two roles to domestic firms: 
(1) They typically produce more complex products, acting as a spur to local suppliers to 
upgrade their own technology base (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996), and; (2) Their increased 
demand for inputs induces employment and growth in domestic upstream firms (Markusen 
and Venables, 1999). However, backward spillovers can work on condition that local 
suppliers have to be technologically advanced to absorb knowledge spillovers and deal 
with the demand for specialized inputs (Kwon and Chun, 2009). Low level of local 
linkages could be due to the incapacity of local firms to meet appropriate quality standards, 
and to compete with global components prices (Athukorala and Menon, 1996; Hobday, 
1996). 
 In fact, a wide range of empirical works have investigated the technological 
spillovers of inward FDI. Görg and Greenaway (2004) review findings of 45 cases on 
                                                 
18
 We aim at input linkages in order to analyze backward spillovers. Also, there is no information of exports 
in data to measure forward linkages. 
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horizontal and/or vertical productivity spillovers of FDI into host developed, transition, 
and developing economies in the period 1966-2000. Nevertheless, there were still very few 
evidences of vertical spillovers. Since the approach of Javorcik (2004) which applied 
Input-Output Tables in calculating vertical foreign presence through backward and forward 
linkages, a large number of papers have deeply analyzed spillover effect of FDI presence 
in upstream and downstream industries.
19
 
 This study uses the case study of Vietnam in the period 2007-2010 after WTO 
accession in order to examine backward spillovers of foreign enterprises which are 
multiple shareholders or from the main traditional investors (China, Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, the United States) and associations (ASEAN, Europe), following the approach of 
the pioneering research of Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011).
20
 It does not stop at finding 
backward productivity spillovers but investigates further the role of investors’ origins.  
 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) use firm level data for the case of Romania to 
investigate whether there existed a difference in the magnitude of vertical (backward) 
spillovers associated with MNEs from three regions, European Union (EU), America, and 
Asia. They found evidence of larger positive knowledge transfer from American investors 
than from EU investors. Their findings strongly support the hypothesis that the share of 
intermediate inputs sourced locally by MNEs from a host country is likely to increase with 
the distance between the host and the source economy (Rodrigues-Clare, 1996). In 
addition, they confirmed the role of regional preferential trade agreements which can 
possibly cause different spillovers of MNEs sourcing from a country in or out of the 
agreement association. Romania signed the Association Agreement with the EU, implying 
that inputs sourced from the EU are subject to a lower tariff than inputs sourced from 
America. Also, EU investors can export to the EU on preferential terms but American 
                                                 
19
 For example, Javorcik (2004), Kim, H. H. and Kim, J. D. (2010) find positive backward productivity 
spillover  for the case of Lithuania, Korea, respectively but Bwalya (2006) finds negative productivity 
spillover in Zambia. 
20
 Some other studies which dealt with spillovers from different origins measure spillovers from one origin as 
the employment share of firms from this origin in total employment of the industry or the region ( see Huang, 
2004 for the case of China; Takii, 2011 for the case of Indonesia) 
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investors cannot. Asian investors were not evidenced to generate spillovers to Romanian 
supplying sectors as they come from developing countries which are unlikely to be a 
source of technology transfer. 
 Lin, Liu and Zhang (2009) partly refer to the origin of FDI and found positive 
horizontal spillovers from OECD investors but negative effects from Hong Kong, Macau, 
and Taiwanese investors (HTM), as in Abraham, Konings, and Slootmaekers (2006). The 
results are interpreted that HTM firms in China are mostly export-oriented while Non-
HTM firms engage in head-to-head competition with domestic firms. In addition, 
technology gap between Chinese firms and HMT firms is not as large as that with firms 
from OECD countries, resulting in more intense competition between Chinese firms and 
HMT firms. Backward spillovers from Non-HTM countries are positive while those from 
HTM are insignificant.  
 In order to explain which factors can drive the degree of technology transfer from 
different sourcing origins, to some extent, some models could be related. Findlay (1978) 
proposes a simple dynamic model to clarify the speed of technological diffusion from FDI. 
The author assumes that the greater the relative disparity in development levels between 
advanced and backward countries, the greater pressure for change within the backward 
country, leading to the more rapidly new technology is imitated. Glass and Saggi (1998) 
use a model to examine the dynamics of FDI and the interplay between FDI, imitation and 
technology transfer from developed to less developed countries. They conclude that with a 
reduction of the technology gap, low quality level of technology is likely to be successfully 
imitated. In order words, the potential for technology transferred could be higher. Standing 
on another view point, the model developed by Rodrigues-Clare (1998) implies that the 
linkage effect of multinationals on the host country is stronger when they come from 
regions that are farther away and more different in terms of their cultural, social and legal 
structures as communication costs between the headquarters and the production plant is 
higher, providing a stronger incentive to buy specialized inputs in the host country. 
However, Görg and Greenaway (2004) points to the absorptive capacity where the 
spillovers have the potential to raise productivity and exploitation which might be related 
to the structural characteristics of the host economy.  
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 From the above theoretical framework, we can see that previous scholars were 
based on the relation between the source and host countries instead of considering the 
background and motivations of investors from different origins when they decide to invest 
in a host economy. As this is expected to form special characteristics of FDI from one 
source country, we pursue the hypotheses as follows. 
 H1: FDI from one source economy could be low-tech or high-tech intensive. Their 
demands on domestic products are possible to be replaced by imports in order to minimize 
production costs. 
 First, we look at the background of MNEs which source spillovers to domestic 
suppliers. The comparative advantage of a source country can result in strong MNEs in 
certain industries in their own economy, implying that MNEs from an origin can 
concentrate on some certain industries in the host economy. Second, based on motivations 
and behaviors of investors when deciding to enter an economy, we argue that the 
demonstration effects can impact their industry selection. The “demonstration effects” is 
firstly defined by Barry, Görg, and Strobl (2003) whereby existing firms send signals to 
new investors as to the reliability and attractiveness of the host country.
21
 Hence, once an 
MNE operates successfully in an economy, the other investors from the same home 
country may be stimulated to enter in the same industry in the host country. Especially, the 
effects would be stronger when investors foresee a business opportunity
22
. This also leads 
to that FDI from one country is associated with some certain industries in the host 
economy. 
 If we consider two types of developing and developed source countries, FDI from 
one origin could be low-tech or high-tech intensive. The demand of investors on domestic 
products could be different, causing possibility of different backward spillovers to local 
suppliers in upstream industries. However, their demand on domestic inputs may be 
replaced by imports in order to minimize production costs. 
                                                 
21
 Barry, Görg, and Strobl (2003) found that both efficiency agglomeration and demonstration effects appear 
to be important factors of entry of US firms in Irelands. 
22
 For example, right after Vietnam became a member of the WTO in 2007, inward FDI increased quickly by 
236 % in the next year while the annual growth rate in the period 2005-2007 is 68%. 
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 H2: For a developing economy in which low-tech industries prevail due to the 
comparative advantage, it is estimated that the potential for spillovers received by 
domestic firms in low-tech industries are higher than those in high-tech industries.  
 This hypothesis is based on the assumptions of technology gap (Glass and Saggi, 
1998) and absorptive capacity of the host economies (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). Type 
of industries that may potentially be entered by MNEs would be also restricted by the 
background of the host economy such as the development level of industries, the 
availability of materials and human resources. Productivity spillovers might be related to 
the structural characteristics of the host economy and absorptive capacity of domestic 
firms. In a developing country, domestic firms are expected to have comparative advantage 
on producing low-tech products. Hence, it is estimated that the potential for spillovers 
received by domestic firms in low-tech industries are higher than those in high-tech 
industries.  
 H3: FDI from origins that the investors demand more low-tech products possibly 
bring higher potential of backward spillovers to local suppliers. 
 This hypothesis derives from two hypotheses above in order to prove that 
investors’ nationality does matter in transferring technology and knowledge to domestic 
suppliers in the host economy. FDI from one origin could be low-tech or high-tech 
intensive. Meanwhile domestic firms in a developing country are expected to be stronger 
in supplying low-tech products than high-tech products. Thus, high-tech investments could 
prefer imports instead of using domestic high-tech products. Demand on low-tech 
domestic products can be larger than that on high-tech domestic products. As a result, low-
tech intensive investments in downstream sectors possibly cause better knowledge transfer 
to local suppliers. 
 The findings in this study show that FDI from origins where the investors demand 
more low-tech products can bring higher backward spillovers to local firms in upstream 
industries. The result could be also driven by the hypothesis of Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2011) as we found negative spillovers from the investors in the Association of Southeast 
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Asian Nations (ASEAN)
23
. The assumption of Rodrigues-Clare (1996) further helps to 
explain the case that backward spillovers from Chinese, ASEAN investors are much lower 
than from other sources and those from Taiwanese investors are lower than being expected. 
We also conclude that trade liberalization for the case of Vietnam is one necessary 
condition to form different spillovers by investors’ nationality. 
 The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the 
presence of MNEs from different nationalities in the Vietnamese manufacturing and the 
role of foreign linkages. Section 3 introduces data, research methodology, and some 
summary statistics. Empirical results are introduced in the next section. Section 5 finally 
presents conclusion and some discussion.    
3.2. FDI in the Vietnamese Process Manufacturing 
 Vietnam has changed to a market oriented economy since 1986. It joined the 
ASEAN in July 1995 and completed the trade liberalization program under ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) in January 1, 2006. In addition, after 16 years since applying to 
participate in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1991, Vietnam was accepted to be a 
full official WTO member in 2007. After WTO accession, the GDP increased with the 
growth rate 6.7% annually, which is 1% lower than that in the period 2001-2006. The 
decrease in GDP growth rate is affected by the world financial crisis and the 
macroeconomic problems in this economy including inflation and asset market instability. 
However, FDI inflows in the period 2007-2010 are much higher than those in the previous 
years when Vietnam was not engaged more deeply in trade liberalization. FDI increased 
with an average rate at 76 % in the period 2006-2007, but enormously bumped to 236 % in 
2008 to reach the top at 71.7 billion dollars, but then reduced strongly (Table 3.1).   
 The most recent Investment Law and Enterprise Law in 2005, which came into 
effect on July 1st 2006, have been a significant progress in creating an attractive 
environment. Foreign investors now can invest in any area not prohibited by laws, instead 
of areas allowed by state agencies. The 2005 Enterprise Law, which was applied to both 
                                                 
23
 ASEAN was established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, then 
expanded to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Myanmar (1997), Laos (1997), and Cambodia (1999). 
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domestic and foreign invested enterprises, provides more encouragement through equal 
rights and obligations of enterprises for all ownership forms (MUTRAP, 2011). 
Table 3.1: Inward FDI in the Vietnamese Economy, 2006-2010 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Inward FDI:      
-  Number of projects 987 1544 1557 1208 1237 
-  Registered capital (Mill. USD) 12004 21347.8 71726 23107.3 19886.1 
-   FDI growth rate    75.5% 77.8% 236.0% -67.8% -13.9% 
 
+ Percentage of total FDI  to 
process manufacturing 
 
68.9% 
 
 
- 
 
 
45.2% 
 
 
17.1% 
 
 
30.1% 
 
+ Manufacturing products in GDP  34.9% 35.0% 33.9% 34.1% 34.6% 
   *Process manufacturing 
products in GDP  21.3% 21.1% 20.2% 20.0% 19.6% 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSO’s data. 
 According to the Vietnamese General Statistics Office (GSO)
24
, the products of 23 
process manufacturing sectors occupy two third in total manufacturing sectors’ products 
and contribute 20.5 % in GDP annually. However, the proportion of total FDI inflow to the 
process manufacturing sectors seriously reduced from 70.5% in 2005 to 17% in 2009, then 
recovered in 2010. The strong reduction is due to a strong movement of inward FDI into 
service sectors, especially in Real Estate and Tourism. Registered capital in manufacturing 
increased from 8.4 trillion dollars in 2006 to 35.7 trillion dollars in 2008, but then fell 
down nearly 8 times in 2009, against 1.5 times for the inward capital in service. 
Confronting the global financial crisis which was forming a grey picture to the economy, 
the inward FDI had a tendency to pour more in the service sectors that still brought back 
more profits in this period. 
  
                                                 
24
 www.gso.org.vn 
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Figure 3.1: Inward FDI in Manufacturing by Nationality, 2006-2010 
 
 Source: Author’s calculations based on the GSO’s data. 
 During these years Vietnam’s manufacturing sectors attracted foreign investors 
from around 70 countries and territories. Accounting for total aggregate FDI of member 
countries in two groups ASEAN
25
 and Europe
26
, Figure 3.1 presents FDI inflows by 
nationality and association in the period 2006-2010. There was a strong wave of inward 
foreign capital from ASEAN, Europe, Japan, and Taiwan in 2008. The wave happened a 
year earlier for the case of South Korea and a year later for the case of the US. Especially, 
the US invested 8.4 billion dollars to occupy 43% of total inward FDI in the year 2009.
27
 
Foreign investors entered in this market in belief that Vietnam owned the most favorable 
assets as market growth, access to regional markets, cheap labor, and incentives 
(UNCTAD, 2009). 
 The Vietnamese government has objectives to attract capital from high technology 
intensive countries such as the US, EU, Japan in hope for better technology transfer to 
                                                 
25
  ASEAN includes Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Laos, and Cambodia 
who directly invest in Vietnam. 
26
 Europe comprises of Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Italy, United Kingdom, Switzerland and Denmark. 
27
 The author’s calculation based on statistical data of the GSO. 
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domestic firms. FDI is encouraged to flow in manufactures of informatics, electrical 
machinery and equipments, biotechnology, and food products (FTA
28
, 2008). 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
3.3.1. Data source 
 The data used in this study is from the annual enterprise censuses conducted by the 
GSO. They started from 2000 to survey on 100 % of state-owned enterprises and non-state 
owned firms in service sectors and 29 manufacturing sectors which are divided into 3 
industrial groups: 4 industries in Mining and Quarrying; 2 industries in Electricity, Gas and 
Water Supply; and 23 industries in process manufacturing (VSIC-1993)
29
. The 
questionnaires reflect rich information on domestic and foreign ownership, output, sales, 
assets, employment, location, products, etc. but no direct information of material inputs, 
except the years 2000 through 2006. Number of enterprises increases from a low of 42,307 
enterprises in 2000 to a high of 286,541 enterprises in 2010, reflecting the development of 
this country and the success of the policy whereby private sectors freely develop in a 
market economy. 
 This study uses a firm-level data set from the GSO for 23 process manufacturing 
industries in the Vietnamese economy covering the period 2007-2010 after Vietnam joined 
the WTO. Based on the Standard Industrial Technological Classification Revision 2 
(Hatzichronoglou, 1997), the industries are divided into 15 low-tech sectors and 8 high-
tech sectors (see Appendix B.1). The data set is unbalanced, including 129,413 
observations in the period 2007-2010 of which 11.34% (14,680 observations) are foreign 
owned. The sample accounts 72.3% of the whole number of enterprises in the process 
manufacturing sectors so it is expected that this data set can reflect the true economic 
situation in this country. A firm with the foreign equity share larger than 10% is considered 
foreign owned. To form the data, we deal with some issues: (1) controlling zero and 
missing values of sales, capital, labor, materials; (2) dropping observations of which the 
                                                 
28
 The Vietnamese Foreign Trade Association (www.fia.mpi.gov.vn) 
29
 The Vietnamese Standard Industrial Classification, 1993. 
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foreign share is higher than 1; and (3) For the foreign firms, missing values of equity 
shares are replaced by the values of the previous year. 
 We apply input-output (I/O) tables provided by the GSO (2007) which are the most 
recent and comprise 138 product categories in order to calculate the backward linkages 
from 2007 to 2010. The I/O table gives input coefficients in aspect of production 
technology applied to create products, gross capital formation, final consumptions and 
exports, and some other indicators. By using one I/O table for the whole period, we assume 
that the input coefficients are constant over time by nationality of the investors. 
3.3.2. The model and calculation strategy 
 We apply an augmented Cobb Douglas production function.  
                                                                
      
 As an alternative, we also use the Levinson and Petrin (2003) method to calculate 
total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is then modeled as a function of foreign presence in 
the same industries and in downstream industries by origin. 
                                              
 Variables: 
 Yijt is the output which is represented by the sales from the main industry of 
firm i operating in sector j at time t.
30
 Kijt stands for the capital, defined as the value of 
fixed assets at the beginning of the year. Mijt, material inputs, are calculated by total 
expenditure of firm i, which are equal to total sales minus total profit, minus by total wage. 
We assumed total expenditure is mostly for materials and labor payments.
31
 Sales, capital, 
                                                 
30
 Previous studies using the same data source (Le and Pomfret, 2008; Nguyen, P. L., 2008) used output but 
firms are asked to directly give output at the base year 1994 so the given data could be not correct. Besides, 
there are much more missing values of output compared to sales. Moreover, different from some other 
studies (Nguyen, D. C. et al., 2008) using total sales, this measure is better to treat the case when the total 
sales of a firm can come from doing business on other industries, or investing in financial market. 
31
 Bitzer and Görg (2009) measured materials as the difference between gross output and value added. 
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and materials are all deflated by the Producer Price Index for 23 appropriate two-digit 
manufacturing sectors to get the resulting values at the base year 2007. Labor Lijt is defined 
by the number of employees working in the main industry of a firm
32
.  
 We apply the approach of Javorcik (2004) in order to calculate backward spillovers 
for different FDI sourcing origins and horizontal spillovers.  
 Horizontaljt captures the presence of foreign firms in sector j at time t, defined by 
the foreign equity participation (foreign share) averaged over all firms in the sector, 
weighted by each firm’s share in sectoral sales. For those foreign firms that the information 
of foreign equity is missing, we set foreign share equal to 100%. 
    
∑                       
∑        
 
 Backwardmjt is proxy for the presence of the investors from country or association 
m (ASEAN, Taiwan,  South Korea,  Japan ,  China ,  the U S,  Europe,  and 
Mult iple holders )  in downstream industries which are being supplied by sector j at 
time t. ajk is the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to sector k, calculated from the I/O 
table 2007. The higher appearance of foreign buyers might result in a negative or positive 
productivity effect on local firms.  
         
        
              
 where: 
     
∑                           
∑        
 
 Dm is equal to 1 if foreign firms in sector j come from country or association m, or 
zero otherwise. 
 Based on the calculation strategy above, we have Basean, Bamerica, Bchina, 
                                                 
32
 Due to lack of data, we cannot apply labor as efficiency units so we accept the same efficiency for a labor 
working in every enterprise. Javorcik (2004) divided the wage bill by the minimum wage.  
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Beurope, Bjapan, Bsouthkorea, Btaiwan, and Bmulti by year and industry. The latter 
stands for the presence of foreign multiple shareholder firms in downstream industries. 
  Low-tech Intensity Indicator (LTI): 
 We set up this indicator in order to examine whether the demands of foreign buyers 
concentrate more on low-tech or high-tech products. Therefore, we separate Backwardmt 
into Bmt_lowtech and Bmt_hightech which represent the presence of foreign buyers from country 
or association m in downstream industries which are being supplied by domestic firms in 
15 low-tech or 8 high-tech industries respectively.  
 If j = 15 low-tech industries:   
               
∑      
  
 
 If j = 8 high-tech industries: 
                
∑      
 
 
 Then,  
        
          
           
 
 If LTI for backward linkages is higher than 100%, the buyers from country or 
association m purchase more local low-tech products. If LTI is equal or lower than 100%, 
the buyers from country or association m purchase more local high-tech products. 
 We can apply the same way to calculate Hm_lowtech and Hm_hightech  in order to 
estimate LTI for horizontal linkages (LTI=100*Hm_lowtech/ Hm_hightech) with which we are 
able to examine whether the investors from country or association m appear more in low-
tech or high-tech industries. 
3.3.3. The Levinson and Petrin method 
 From the production function above, many econometric methods could be applied. 
In order to obtain robust and consistent coefficients, we must solve the nature problem of 
error terms. The results from fixed effects estimator will be consistent but those from OLS 
estimator are both consistent and efficient when the error term is independently and 
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identically distributed. However, we are still faced with the problem of input endogeneity 
in a production function. Hence, we also use the methodology described in Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) and Petrin, Poi, and Levinsohn (2004) which uses intermediate inputs as a 
proxy to control for unobservable productivity shocks (LP hereafter).
33
 
 Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function model: 
𝑦                           
where ωt denotes productivity, a state variable which can impact the choices of inputs; and 
εt stands for an error term that is uncorrelated with input choices. Both ωt and εt are 
unobserved. Firms’ decision in inputs could give rise to simultaneity bias. The positive 
correlation between ωt and inputs used in period s will yield inconsistent results. 
 Olley and Pakes  (1996)  develop  an  estimator  that  uses  investment as a proxy 
for  these  unobservable  shocks. The LP method highlighted that intermediates may 
respond more smoothly to productivity shocks. Accordingly, demand for the 
intermediate inputs mt is assumed to depend on capital stock kt and state variable ωt.  
mt= mt(kt, ωt) 
 Since the demand function is monotonically increasing in ωt (Levinsohn and 
Petrin, 2003), we have the inversion of the intermediate demand function: 
ωt= ωt(kt, mt) 
 Assumed that productivity is governed by a ﬁrst-order Markov process:  
ωt = E[ωt|ωt−1] + ξt 
where ξt denotes a productivity innovation term. 
 If we use revenues as the dependent variable in the model, then the production 
function is given as:  
                                                 
33
 The LP method is preferred to the Olley and Pakes (1996) method which used investment as a proxy for 
productivity shocks for two reasons: (1) the investment proxy may not smoothly respond to the productivity 
shock, violating the consistency condition, and (2) using intermediate input proxies avoids truncating all the 
zero investment firms. 
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𝑦          (     )     
where now: φt(kt, mt) = α + βtkt + βmmt +ωt(kt, mt) 
 The function φt can be estimated with a third-order polynomial approximation in mt 
and kt, and thus this first stage of the estimation yields the estimation   ̂ of βl 
 The coefficients on capital and intermediate inputs are obtained in the second stage. 
For any candidate values βk* and βm*, we estimate   ̂ by using:  
  ̂     ̂     
       
    
 Then the residual of the production function is computed as:  
     ̂   𝑦     ̂      
       
     [       ̂ ] 
where a consistent approximation of the expected value of ωt is given as:   
  ̂                    
        
     
 The residual must interact with at least two instruments to identify both βk and βm. 
The estimations   ̂ of βk and   ̂ of βm are found as the solution by minimizing the sample 
residual of the production function with respect to βk* and βm*. The LP method applies the 
GMM estimator using lag values of inputs as instruments. A bootstrapping procedure is 
also used to construct the standard errors for   ̂,   ̂, and   ̂. 
 TFP is then measured as the difference between the actual and predicted output. 
                         
3.3.4. Summary statistics 
 As can be seen from Table 3.2, a foreign enterprise is, on average, 50% larger than 
a local firm in terms of sales, capital, and employment. Particularly, the firms owned by 
the Japanese, ASEAN countries, or multiple holders are larger than those from other 
sources. For all backward linkages by nationality, the means are lower than the standard 
deviation, revealing the high dispersion of the foreign buyers’ presence in 23 industries. 
This could be a signal expressing that the investors focus on buying products of some 
certain industries. Japanese and Taiwanese investors are the largest customers of the 
domestic firms as Backwards from these sources are the highest at 2.9% and 2.6% in an 
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industry respectively. 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Domestic firms: Foreign firms:  
Log sales 114,733 7.63 1.84 14,680 10.03 1.87    
Log capital 114,733 6.27 1.85 14,680 9.03 1.86    
Log labor 114,733 2.92 1.36 14,680 4.81 1.52    
Log materials 114,733 7.31 2.08 14,680 9.73 1.91    
European affiliates: ASEAN affiliates:  
Log sales 943 10.43 2.11 1,197 10.67 1.83    
Log capital 943 8.88 2.23 1,197 9.39 1.81    
Log labor 943 4.83 1.49 1,197 4.76 1.38    
Log materials 943 10.97 2.25 1,197 10.42 1.86    
American affiliates: Chinese affiliates: Japanese affiliates: 
Log sales 392 9.78 2.11 863 9.56 1.92 1,739 10.56 1.85 
Log capital 392 8.75 2.06 863 8.37 1.78 1,739 9.65 1.91 
Log labor 392 4.48 1.39 863 4.41 1.45 1,739 5.05 1.44 
Log materials 392 9.44 2.17 863 9.33 1.89 1,739 10.33 1.88 
South Korean affiliates: Taiwanese affiliates: Multinationals: 
Log sales 2,856 9.84 1.70 4,767 9.77 1.71 475 11.20 1.93 
Log capital 2,856 8.74 1.75 4,767 8.98 1.67 475 9.97 1.92 
Log labor 2,856 4.95 1.58 4,767 4.77 1.50 475 5.35 1.51 
Log materials 2,856 9.45 1.73 4,767 9.51 1.73 475 10.96 2.04 
 
horizontal 
 
129,413 
 
37.7% 
 
16.1% 
     
B_America 129,413 0.22% 0.23%  B_Japan 129,413 2.90% 5.02% 
B_ASEAN 129,413 0.95% 1.23%  B_Southkorea 129,413 1.22% 1.42% 
B_China 129,413 0.38% 0.62%  B_Taiwan 129,413 2.58% 3.53% 
B_Europe 129,413 1.17% 1.29%  B_Multi 129,413 1.35% 1.51% 
 Investors from 70 countries and territories have invested in Vietnamese 
manufacturing in the period 2007-2010, but Asian economies account for the major part of 
these capital flows. Figure 3.2 introduce the shares of MNEs and the investors from 
ASEAN, Europe, the US, China, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea in the manufacturing sector. 
51 
 
Taiwanese and the Japanese are the principle investors with the equal shares at 24% in the 
period 2007-2010. Following are the investors from South Korea, ASEAN, and Europe. 
Figure 3.2: The Investors' Shares in Manufacturing by Nationality, 2007 - 2010 
  
 Inward FDI from different origins focuses on some certain industries (see Appendix 
B.2). For instance, US investments concentrate more on manufactures of motor vehicles 
but investment from the EU focuses more on manufactures of coke, refined petroleum 
products or chemical products. While the investors from ASEAN focus on manufactures of 
food products and beverages, those from China are interested in manufactures of transport 
equipment and wearing apparel. Korean FDI focuses on manufacture of radio, 
telecommunication, and communication equipment. Japanese and Taiwanese FDI 
respectively participate more in manufactures of computing machinery, machinery and 
medical instruments; and manufactures of tanning and dressing of leather, textiles, and 
furniture.  
 Therefore, investors from different origins might have their own motivations and 
behaviors when investing in a host economy. Probably, the demonstration effects and the 
comparative advantage of a source economy affect the decisions of the investors to choose 
one industry to entry. When classifying industries based on the technology level, we 
consider the results in Table 3.3 which presents LTI by origin for Backwards and 
Horizontals in the period 2007-2010. The calculation method of LTI is given in part 3.2. 
LTI for Backwards represents if foreign buyers from one origin demand more low-tech or 
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11% 
the US 
4% 
China 
3% 
Europe 
8% 
Japan 
24% South Korea 
12% 
Taiwan 
24% 
Multi 
5% Others 
9% 
52 
 
high-tech products. Meanwhile, LTI for Horizontals stands for whether investments from 
this origin focus more on low-tech or high-tech industries. 
Table 3.3: Low-tech Intensity Indicator of FDI by Nationality, 2007-2010 
% 
LTI_ backward 
LTI_ 
horizontal 
2007  2008 2009 2010 Average Average 
Taiwan 242.3 241.3 232.4 242.5 239.6 192.9 
China 217.3 292.6 301.3 319.5 282.7 218.6 
The US 258.9 200.5 235.6 202.6 224.4 99.3 
ASEAN 268.2 194.2 190.6 183.2 209.1 108.9 
Europe 201.8 193.8 192.5 158.9 186.8 83.2 
South Korea 110.1 112.9 111.7 150.2 121.3 105.7 
Multinationals 117.9 121.5 104.3 131.4 118.8 13.6 
Japan 63.1 60.3 63.2 57.6 61.1 9.0 
 Accordingly, foreign firms buy more products of the local firms in low-tech 
industries than in high-tech industries since LTIs_backward are on average, higher than 
100% except the case of Japan. American and European investments, and Multinational 
enterprises appear more in high-tech industries (LTIs_horizontal > 100%), while ASEAN, 
Chinese, and South Korean investments are more in low-tech industries (LTIs_horizontal 
< 100%).  Particularly, Japanese investment concentrates more on high-tech industries 
(LTI_horizontal = 9%) and purchase more high-tech products (LTI_backward = 61.1%).  
 If it is assumed that a firm working in high-tech or low-tech industries will use 
more high-tech and low-tech inputs respectively, the US, Europe and MNEs are special 
cases when using more low-tech inputs. It is possible that these investors demand fewer 
inputs from local firms in high-tech downstream industries since they use high propensity 
of imports in production. Or with a lower probability, most firms from these source 
countries have special production processes which require more inputs from low-tech 
upstream industries. 
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3.4. Spillovers through Backward Linkages by Nationality 
3.4.1. Backward spillovers by investors’ nationality 
 Table 3.4 shows the results for the estimations of the baseline specification to find 
productivity spillovers to domestic firms through backward linkages by sourcing origin. 
First, the OLS estimation is applied in column 1. The results seem to be partly consistent 
with our expectations. We find that American, Chinese and Taiwanese investors who 
demand more low-tech products (LTI > 200%) bring higher spillovers to domestic 
suppliers than those investors from other sources (LTI< 200%). Productivity of domestic 
firms is negatively correlated with the presence of ASEAN investors in downstream 
sectors although the ASEAN firms demand more low-tech products than high-tech 
products.  
Table 3.4: Backward Spillovers by Nationality, 2007-2010 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Var._ lnY Dependent Var._ lnTFP 
OLS FE OLS FE FE 
 
lnK 
 
0.0141*** 
 
0.0155*** 
   
 (0.00147) (0.00213)    
lnL 0.240*** 0.217***    
 (0.00263) (0.00473)    
lnM 0.744*** 0.697***    
 (0.00222) (0.00360)    
horizontal 0.123*** 0.0790* 0.135*** 0.0273 0.0197 
 (0.0455) (0.0472) (0.0465) (0.0333) (0.0324) 
      
Btaiwan 2.175*** 1.074** 2.139*** 1.866*** 2.276*** 
 (0.424) (0.470) (0.429) (0.315) (0.321) 
Bchina 3.173*** -2.368** 3.014*** -1.901*** -1.678** 
 (1.025) (1.073) (1.036) (0.714) (0.740) 
Bamerica 10.87*** 4.605** 9.481*** 2.565* 4.230** 
 (2.080) (2.303) (2.080) (1.504) (1.692) 
Basean -6.339*** -5.555*** -6.802*** -8.226*** -8.510*** 
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 (1.409) (1.517) (1.422) (1.202) (1.135) 
Beurope 1.985*** 1.847** 2.677*** 2.591*** 1.221* 
 (0.699) (0.783) (0.701) (0.712) (0.635) 
Bsouthkorea -0.0558 -0.192 0.203 0.200 -0.186 
 (0.856) (0.904) (0.882) (0.350) (0.363) 
Bmulti -0.429 0.0224 -0.246 0.343 0.203 
 (0.358) (0.374) (0.371) (0.325) (0.326) 
Bjapan 1.469*** 0.186 1.356*** -0.402*** -0.323*** 
 (0.344) (0.369) (0.350) (0.112) (0.108) 
      
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Sector dummies Y Y Y N N 
Observations 114,733 114,733 114,733 114,733 114,733 
R-squared 0.950 0.808 0.076 0.085 0.086 
Groups  55,229  55,229 55,229 
(i) Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
(ii) (***), (**), and (*) denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
(iii) The results in Columns 3 through 5 are corrected by the LP method. 
(iv) For the results in column 4, P_values of F_tests for the hypotheses: 0.000 (Btaiwan=0, Basean=0, 
Beurope=0, Bjapan=0), 0.007 (Bchina=0), 0.088 (Bamerica=0), 0.568 (Bsouthkorea=0), 0.291 
(Bmulti=0). 
 However, the results from the OLS estimator could be biased if the error term is not 
independently and identically distributed. Next, we use the fixed effects estimator in order 
to purge the firm specific time invariant effects (Column 2). By using year and industrial 
dummies, this estimator can control time-series and sector variation in the data. Generally, 
solving individual effects lowers coefficients and even reverses the sign of backward 
spillovers for the case of China. Meanwhile, the presence of multinational firms and 
investors from South Korean do not affect the productivity of local firms in both OLS and 
within estimations.   
 After dealing with input endogeneity by the LP method, we apply the OLS 
estimator (Column 3) and the FE estimator (Column 4) for regressing lnTFP in response to 
horizontal and backwards by origin. As can be seen from Column 4, while foreign firms 
from ASEAN, China and Japan cause negative effects to the productivity of local suppliers 
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in upstream industries, those from Taiwan, the US, and Europe bring positive impacts. We 
do not find significant results for the presence of South Korean investment and MNEs. 
 ASEAN and China are located nearby Vietnam (Appendix B.3). Significantly 
negative spillovers from these origins are in line with Lin, Liu and Zhang (2009) for the 
case of China. They find that FDI from OECD generated positive horizontal and backward 
spillovers to China while FDI from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (nearby China) 
brought negative horizontal and irrelevant backward spillovers. The results are also 
supported by Giround and Mirza (2006) which conclude that transnational companies 
originating from ASEAN have a negative relationship with the level of local supply 
linkages in ASEAN members as these companies are strongly reliant on intra-firm imports 
of materials.  
 The highest spillovers come from American investors with a significant coefficient 
at the 10% level. If US firms increase their presence in downstream industries by 1%, total 
factor productivity (TFP) of domestic suppliers will go up by nearly 2.5%. This evidence is 
in line with Driffield and Mohd Noor (1999) that US firms are more embedded in Malaysia 
through input linkages than Japanese, EU or other Southeast Asian firms, which possibly 
due to distance between Malaysia and home countries.
34
 
 In order to check robustness, we investigate how the presence of wholly foreign 
owned firms impacts productivity of domestic suppliers (Column 5)
35
. In this case, 
backward spillovers from Taiwanese and American investors are much improved by 22% 
and 64.9% respectively but those from European investors are much reduced by 52.9%. 
Again, the presence of South Korean investors and MNEs has no effects on productivity of 
domestic firms in upstream sectors. 
                                                 
34
 Driffield and Mohd Noor (1999) examined local input linkages on inward investors in the Malaysian 
electronics and electrical industry. The study accounts input linkages as proportion of non-labor and labor 
local inputs in total inputs of a foreign investor. 
35
 A wholly foreign owned firm from one country is a firm with 100% foreign share from this origin. 
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3.4.2. The relation between backward spillover and LTI 
 The evidence from LP-Within estimator lends support to our hypothesis. Figure 3.3 
shows the relation between LTI_backward and backward spillovers by origin withdrawn 
from the results in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3.4. If we ignore the spillovers from ASEAN, 
Chinese, and Taiwanese investors, we see that FDI from an origin which has higher 
LTI_backward, representing higher propensity of buying more low-tech products, can 
cause higher backward spillovers onto indigenous firms (see the left graph). This is 
consistent to hypothesis 3. The trend is stronger when we account for only wholly foreign 
capital from one origin (see the right graph). Spillovers are increasing for investments 
from Japan, Multinational enterprises, South Korea, the EU, and the US. 
 We argue that the results derive from 2 channels. First, although the demonstration 
effect and the comparative advantage of a source country can result in industry allocation, 
leading to different domestic demand on inputs of investors, their domestic demand is 
driven by import decisions with the objective to minimize production costs
36
 (hypothesis 
1).As a result, our hypotheses are affected by the hypotheses of Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2011) and Rodrigues-Clare (1996) (for the cases of ASEAN, China, and Taiwan). 
ASEAN and China are not only neighbor countries of Vietnam but also sign free 
trade agreements with these countries.
37
 Vietnam has trade relations with 168 countries 
during the period 2007-2009, but imports from ASEAN and China accounted for 24.3% 
and 23.8% of total imports respectively. Investors from these origins are expected to have 
high possibility of using cheaper imports from home countries due to the rules of origin, 
which could lead to lower tariff and transportation costs. These put domestic suppliers in a 
weaker position which can lessen their bargaining power when making contracts with 
these investors, resulting in negative spillovers from these origins.  
                                                 
36
 Barry, Görg, and Strobl (2003) found out that US firms are highly concentrated in modern high-tech 
sectors such as office machinery, electrical engineering, other machinery and chemicals (including 
pharmaceuticals). 
37
 Under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) of the AFTA, Vietnam is committed to reducing 
tariff on all but few sensitive items from AFTA member countries to less than 5% by the year 2006. It also 
has agreements under ASEAN auspices with China in 2002. 
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Figure 3.3: The Relation between Backward Spillover and LTI, 2007 - 2010 
  
 Taiwan is also located near Vietnam. Their investment focuses on tanning and 
dressing of leather, garment and textiles. Backward spillovers from Taiwanese FDI are 
positive but lower than being expected, as Taiwan has the highest LTI_backward. The 
result could also depend on the nature of their industry allocation. Garment manufacturers 
may relocate in Vietnam to take advantage of the availability of cheap labor but still rely 
on existing suppliers, including their own factories in the home country, as highlighted in 
Giround and Mirza (2006). 
 Second, as a developing country, Vietnam has the comparative advantage to 
produce low-tech products. Thus, Vietnamese firms in low-tech industries can absorb 
backward spillovers better than those in high-tech industries as they are expected to meet 
appropriate quality standards of products in order to compete with global components 
prices, as highlighted by Athukorala and Menon (1996).
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3.4.3. An extension: in relation to the crowding effect 
 As being referred to in hypothesis 1, backward spillovers by origin for the case of 
Vietnam are influenced by the possibility that foreign firms from one origin could import 
                                                 
38
 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) produced evidence of no significant spillovers from Asian investors to 
Romanian suppliers as they came from developing countries which are impossible to be a source of 
technology transfer. 
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inputs instead of using domestic products. The lack of local linkages could be due to 
MNE’s sourcing practices that gave preference to home country firms (Guyton, 1995). 
 The crowding-out effect is another channel to affect FDI spillovers. Foreign firms 
in intra-industries can play two roles. On the one hand, their increased presence can crowd 
out domestic firms in the same industries, imposing a demand reduction on products 
supplied by domestic firms in upstream industries. Thus, this is possible to lower 
productivity of domestic suppliers. On the other hand, they may use supplying network or 
subcontract with local firms, which can encourage them to push up their production, which 
can strengthen productivity of domestic suppliers. In order to check the crowding effects, 
we estimate the possibility of domestic firm exit when appearing foreign firms from 
different origins in the same industries (Appendix B.4).
39
 
 The presence of American firms appears to have the highest impact on domestic 
firm exit.  They are very competitive to attract higher preference of consumers on their 
high-quality products. Investors from most of source countries and associations crowd out 
domestic firms except those from ASEAN and multiple holders. For the case of ASEAN, it 
is possible that products from this origin do not prevail compared to domestic firms. 
Meanwhile, multiple holders are normally larger than domestic firms. They are expected to 
use more domestic supplying network so they do not harm the survival of domestic firms 
in intra-industries.  
Based on the summary in Table 3.5, different spillovers by origin through 
backward linkages could be explained as follows. For the case of ASEAN investors, 
although their appearance fosters the survival of domestic firms in the same industry which 
can increase their domestic demand on domestic products, a very high possibility of using 
imports prevail. These could lessen productivity of domestic suppliers. Negative spillovers 
from Chinese investors are due to high import propensity and positive crowding-out 
effects, which surpass knowledge transfer to local firms. Despite Taiwan is likely to have 
lower import possibility and crowding-out effects than China, they are possible to transfer 
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 The ‘exit’ variable is set equal to 1 at the year domestic firms exit the market, and zero otherwise.  
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more knowledge to domestic firms. Therefore, the backward spillovers are positive but 
lower than being expected. 
For the other sources including Europe, the United States, South Korea, Japan and 
multiple enterprises, the findings show that FDI from origins where the investors demand 
more low-tech products can bring higher backward spillovers to local firms in upstream 
industries despite positive crowding-out effects from these origins (except the case of 
multiple enterprises). Low possibility of imports may entail stronger bargaining power of 
domestic suppliers when dealing business with these origins.   
Table 3.5: Factors Impact Backward Spillovers 
Origin ASEAN China Taiwan US EU South 
Korea 
Multi. Japan 
Imports 
possibility 
+ + + - - - - - 
Crowding-
out effects 
-1.337 2.292 0.456 9.442 0.513 1.278 -0.898 1.001 
B. Spillover -8.226 -1.901 1.866 2.565 2.591 0 0 -0.402 
B_LTI  209.1 282.7 239.6 224.4 186.8 121.3 118.8 61.1 
Results Backward spillovers are 
distorted by hypothesis of 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 
(2011) and Rodrigues-Clare 
(1996). 
As estimated: the higher LTI, the higher backward 
spillover. 
 However, Japanese investments cause negative spillovers through backward 
linkages although they are the largest customers of domestic firms and their crowding 
effects are much smaller than the US. The only reason lies on low absorptive capacity of 
local suppliers in high-tech industries. We argue that Vietnam has no comparative 
advantage on producing high-tech products in this period. Furthermore, Japanese investors 
possibly have higher incentives to protect technology and know-how linkages. Older 
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technology or knowledge is transferred more readily to the domestic sector (Driffield and 
Mohd Noor, 1999).
40
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 Using a firm level data set for the case of Vietnamese manufacturing in the period 
post WTO-accession from 2007 to 2010, this study examines whether origins of investors 
influence sign and magnitude of backward productivity spillovers to domestic firms in 
upstream sectors. The results show that backward spillovers can occur in two ways for the 
case of Vietnam.  
 First, we take origin heterogeneity into consideration by separating investments 
into high-tech and low-tech industries, which can form individual characteristics of 
investments from one origin. The investment can appear more in high-tech/low-tech 
industries and demand more high-tech/low-tech products. When Vietnam is involved more 
in trade liberalization, the origins of which foreign firms demand more low-tech products 
(higher LTI) cause higher spillovers to domestic firms through backward linkages. We find 
evidence of the highest backward linkages from US investments and low backward 
linkages from Japanese investments. 
 Second, the spillovers are distorted strongly for the case of ASEAN, China, and 
Taiwan due to 2 factors: (1) The preferential trade agreement between Vietnam and other 
ASEAN countries are likely to lower the spillovers from affiliates in this region, and (2) 
These three origins are nearby Vietnam. Hence, share of intermediate inputs sourced 
locally by foreign firms from these origins is likely to be higher than foreign firms from 
other origins. The results are in line with Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) and Lin, Liu and 
Zhang (2009). 
 This study makes some contribution into existing literature by offering the roles of 
the comparative advantage and the demonstration effects. Being affected by demonstration 
effects and comparative advantage of a source country, investments from this origin and 
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 Driffield and Mohd Noor (1999) found that Japanese transnational companies are the least likely to foster 
local input linkages with Malaysian firms since they prefer to use inputs from other home firms with whom 
they have vertical relations elsewhere.  
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their demand can be low-tech/high-tech intensive. By contrast, the comparative advantage 
of a host country, for example a developing country, can help local firms to be strong at 
low-tech products.
41
Hence, foreign invested firms are expected to buy more low-tech 
products in a developing country. As a result, indigenous firms in low-tech industries could 
absorb backward spillovers better than firms in high-tech industries. 
After WTO accession, the Vietnamese government has the policy to encourage 
investments more in high-tech industries in hope for better technology transfer to domestic 
firms
42
. In sum, our findings highlight a clear message that in order to take advantages of 
backward linkage, local suppliers have to be technologically advanced to absorb 
knowledge spillovers and deal with the demand for high-tech inputs.  
 
  
                                                 
41
 As indicated in the World Investment Prospects survey for the period 2008-2010 by UNCTAD, Vietnam is 
ranked 6
th
 on top destinations for FDI. According to the respondents, the major asset of this country is the 
availability of low-cost skilled labor, followed by market growth, the size of the regional and local markets, 
and the desire to follow competitors and availability of incentives. 
42
 Vietnam has focused on growing high tech parks where infrastructures are better to support high-tech 
enterprises. For example: Hoa Lac High Tech Park (1,586 hectares, Hanoi Capital), Saigon Hi-tech Park (913 
hectares, Ho Chi Minh City), and QuangTrung Software City (43 hectares, Ho Chi Minh City). 
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4. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND LABOR MARKET 
ADJUSTMENTS IN VIETNAMESE MANUFACTURING 
Pham Dinh Long, Pham Thi Bich Ngoc, and Holger Görg 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Trade openness has historically gone hand in hand with better economic 
performance, in both developed and developing economies, creating new opportunities for 
workers, consumers and firms around the globe through a positive business climate, 
flexible labor markets, high-quality education and skill training systems (OECD, 2012). 
Still, once a developing country has opened up to international markets, concerns over 
employment and wage decline have been posed.  
Trade particularly affects employment and wages in several ways. First, trade can 
increase per capita incomes though output growth, resulting in real average wage 
increases.
43
  Second, increased exports and imports can raise productivity growth, creating 
higher skill and higher wage jobs.
44
 However, trade liberalization may, at least in the short 
term, put pressure on less competitive industries, triggering unemployment and downward 
wage trends. Third, skill-biased technological change may increase demand for skilled 
labor, leading to wage inequality (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Fourth, the impact of trade 
liberalization possibly increases industry wage premium, which reflects industry rents. 
                                                 
43
 The OECD Growth Study estimated that a 10 percentage point increase in trade openness translates over 
time into an increase of around 4% in per capita income in the OECD area. China and India demonstrate how 
policies thatliberalize trade and investment can contribute to raising incomes in developing countries (OECD, 
2012). 
44
 Exporters in the United States on average pay wages that are about 6% higher than non-exporters (Bernard 
et al., 2007) 
63 
 
Furthermore, due to imperfect competition, different levels of rent sharing between firms 
and workers among industries can cause wage differentials (Ghazali, 2011). 
 Previous empirical studies have found conflicting results about labor market 
adjustment to trade liberalization which could manifest itself through increasing imports, 
exports, and offshoring, or decreasing tariffs and non-tariffs barriers, leading to changes in 
the effective rate of protection (ERP). For instance, Stone and Cepeda (2011) find that 
imports have a strong and positive effect on wages in 55 OECD and non-OECD countries, 
but Ravenga (1997) produces evidence of negative effects of trade reforms on employment 
and wages in Mexican manufacturing. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) find a positive 
relationship between tariffs and the industry wage premium. Focusing on the impact on 
employment, Sakurai (2004) concludes that increased trade negatively impacts 
employment for the case of Japan. By contrast, Sen (2002) points out that international 
trade caused positive employment growth in Bangladesh and Kenya.  Currie and Harrison 
(1997) find no impact of trade openness on employment in Morocco.  
 The specific objective of this study is to investigate how labor markets respond to 
trade liberalization in Vietnam over the period 2003-2008.  We follow and build upon the 
approach by Revenga (1997) and analyze the link between trade liberalization, 
employment and wages using empirical models at both industry and firm levels.  As in 
Revenga (1997) we allow trade protection (measured as effective rate of protection, ERP) 
to affect wages and employment directly at industry level and indirectly at firm level 
through changes in output and quasi rents. More specifically, in the firm level analysis, we 
use trade policy variables, i.e. ERP and import penetration, as instruments for the 
endogenous independent variables, i.e. output and quasi rents. We use panel datasets at 
industry and firm levels for manufacturing sectors which come from the Vietnamese 
General Statistics Office (GSO) and the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA)’s small and medium enterprise (SME) surveys. 
 Since opening up to the world economy in 1986, Vietnam has strongly embarked 
on the trade liberalization process by being involved in many bilateral and multilateral 
agreements (Japan, China, US, ASEAN, APEC, EU, WTO), reflecting decreasing ERP and 
increasing import penetration due to tariff reductions. Based on this background, we show 
64 
 
a negative impact of trade reforms on firm-level wages and employment at both industry 
and firm levels in Vietnamese manufacturing over the period 2003-2008. Additionally, the 
paper improves our understanding of trade liberalization effects by taking into account the 
rent sharing
45
 between firms and employees as an adjustment mechanism to face trade 
policy changes. We find trade-induced decreases in quasi rents which represent a decline in 
wages.  
 The approach on quasi rents further allows us to identify heterogeneity in 
bargaining power across firms by gender and skill composition. A firm with a greater 
fraction of unskilled (production) or female workers shows a lower ability of workers to 
capture part of the quasi rents. This finding provides evidence for gender and skill earning 
differentials in Vietnamese manufacturing. However, trade liberalization can moderate 
these gaps, as in line with Ghazali (2011) for the case of Tunisia.
46
 In addition, trade 
unions and collective agreements seem to have a role in reducing the skill earning 
inequality. To the best of our knowledge, these relationships have not been 
comprehensively investigated for the case of Vietnam.  
 The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 and 3 respectively provide the 
literature and some facts on trade liberalization and labor markets. Section 4 presents the 
data and some preliminary evidence.  Section 5 discusses the industry level analysis, while 
Section 6 presents the firm level results.  The final section produces some conclusions.  
4.2. Literature on Trade Liberalization and Labor Markets 
 The Heckscher-Ohlin model and its companion Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
(HO/SS) set up a theoretical background on the labor market effects of trade liberalization 
whereby trade openness increases the relative returns to abundant factor and lowers that of 
the scarce factor, expecting increases in wages and reduction in wage inequality. Some 
recent studies provide support for a HO/SS view of trade (see Friedman et al., 2012; Stone 
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 Martins (2007) define rent sharing as “referring to a situation in which rents are shared by the firm, at least 
in some part, with the employees of that firm”. 
46
 Ghazali (2011) indicates that trade reforms appear to have reduce inequality between skilled and unskilled 
labor in Tunisia. 
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and Cepeda, 2011; Bernard et al., 2007) in contrast to the others which find rising wage 
gaps in both developed and developing countries (see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; 
Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998; Pavcnik, 2003). Growing wage inequality can be 
explained in part by the change in the structure of labor demand in favor of skilled 
workers, resulting from skill-biased technological change induced or accelerated by trade 
liberalization (Acemoglu, 2003). Particularly, the underlying causes of changes in labor 
demand in developing countries are based on the increase of capital flows and capital 
assets from developed to developing countries in the era of globalization (Feenstra and 
Hanson, 1997). 
 Referring to employment adjustments, existing literature have found mixed 
results.
47
 Difference in employment response to trade liberalization possibly depends on 
firm behavior in lower/higher profit periods or whether labor markets are in short run or 
long run. Firms can reduce their profit margins rather than adjusted employment or instead, 
they raise productivity of the existing workforce and efficiency gains can be achieved 
without firing labor (see Currie and Harrison, 1997; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995). 
Unemployment could increase in the short run due to external or domestic shocks but 
decline in the long run with permanent changes in trade liberalization when labor market 
returns to long-run employment equilibrium (Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan, 2009; Stone and 
Cepeda, 2011). 
 From another perspective, trade liberalization can impact wages and employment 
directly at industry level but indirectly at firm level. A reduction in trade protection that 
shifts industry product demand will tend to move employment in the same direction 
(Revenga, 1997). Industry wage response in turn depends on wage-setting mechanism. 
With a competitive setting, wages react to market-clearing rates of labor supply and 
demand. In contrast, under imperfect competition, because of the presence of unions for 
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 For example, McMillan and Verduzco(2011) show that employment in manufacturing fell in Latin 
America, the Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa but increased in East Asia and Eastern 
Europe. Exports can contribute to job creation (Heo and Park, 2008; Milner and Wright, 1998; Fu and 
Balasubramanyam, 2004). Gaston (1998) also shows that exports positively affect employment, but imports 
cause a negative impact in Australia. 
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instance, wage and employment adjustments could be based on industry wage premium.
48
 
Industry wage premium channel should be considered in short to medium term horizons 
where prevent free movements of workers across sectors. The premiums can take the form 
of industry rents in the trade models that introduce imperfect competition and rent sharing.  
 Although trade reforms are usually implemented at the industry level, firm-level 
wage and employment adjustments are expected to vary depending on firm characteristics, 
for example market power level, capital or labor intensity, or workforce composition. Also, 
the responses are based on a wage-setting mechanism which presents the bargaining power 
of workers with the presence of unions or collective agreements. Revenga (1997) produces 
the results that many of the rents generated by trade protection were absorbed by workers 
in the form of a wage premium in Mexican manufacturing. Trade liberalization reduced the 
rents available to be captured by firms and workers. Ghazali (2011), following the 
approach of Revenga (1997) for the case of Tunisia, documents that the quasi rents 
reduction, which is one of the adjustment mechanisms used by Tunisian firms to face trade 
openness, reduces wage inequality as skilled labor was more able than unskilled labor to 
capture rents before trade reforms. 
 In regards to the role of union in dealing with the rent sharing, higher rates of 
unionization as well as higher coverage and coordination of collective bargaining have 
been found to be associated with higher wages, lower levels of income inequality and wage 
disparity, a lower gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers as well as a 
lower gap between men and women (Friedman et al. 2012; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; 
Hayter and Weinberg, 2011). On the contrary, Reinecke and Valenzuela (2011) argue that 
the potential role of unions and collective bargaining in improving the distribution of 
wages has been used in a very limited manner in Chile. 
 Meanwhile, rent sharing can reduce employment fluctuations to trade openness due 
to the presence of unions. Revenga (1997) shows that organized labor is important in 
Mexico. The restrictive labor market regulations in this country make it difficult and 
expensive to fire a worker. The author confirms that if wages contain a rent component, 
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 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) define it as the portion of individual wages that cannot explained by worker, 
firm, or job characteristics, but can be explained by the worker’s industry affiliation. 
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workers can be willing to trade off wages to preserve jobs. In contrast, Krugman (1996) 
argues that in countries with rigid wage setting institutions, trade may perhaps have larger 
effects on employment than wages. Görg and Görlich (2011) point out adjustments through 
employment levels in Germany as wage setting arrangements in this country wasa high 
degree of inflexibility, which is done by large unions at the sectoral level.  
4.3. Labor Markets in Vietnam under Trade Liberalization 
4.3.1. Trade liberalization and some facts 
The economic restructuring process (called DoiMoi) started in 1986 when Vietnam 
transformed from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy. GDP 
growth accelerated to 9.8% annually from the early 1990s to 1998 then fell to 7.3% from 
2000 to 2009 (GSO). The economic structure has changed with the tendency towards 
industrialization. During the period 1990 to 2010, the contribution of the agriculture sector 
dropped from 38.7% to 20.9% while that of industry and construction, and service sectors 
changed from 22.7% and 38.6% to 40.2% and 38.9% respectively.  
Figure 4.1: Vietnam’s Imports and Exports, 1990-2010 
 
  Source: GSO (2006, 2011) 
 Vietnam’s total export volume grew from around US$ half a million to reach US$ 
71.6 billion in 2010, which is equivalent to an annual growth rate of 20% (GSO, 2006, 
81.8 
68.1 
53.3 
69.8 74.8 
83.5 88.9 84.1 77.8 
85.6 
104.9 100.2 
111.5 
129.4 
150.3 152.4 
161.7 
182.7 
201.7 
140.7 
161.7 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
0.0
50.0
100.0
150.0
200.0
250.0
Exports  (mill.USD) Imports (mill. USD) Trade as percentage of GDP (%)
68 
 
2011). Imports are generally higher than exports but trade deficits are not very large. Trade 
liberalization contributed to a growing intensity in terms of exports and imports relative to 
GDP (Figure 4.1). 
Since opening up the economy, Vietnam has been party to multilateral and bilateral 
trade agreements and MFN agreements with over 80 nations (MUTRAP, 2011). For 
example, bilateral trade agreements with the European Union and the United States were 
signed in 1992 and 2000 respectively. Joining ASEAN in 1995, Vietnam started 
implementing tariff reductions under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (CEPT/AFTA) which began in 2001 and was completed by the 
beginning of 2006. Agreements under ASEAN auspices with China and Japan came into 
effect in 2002 and 2003 respectively. The country joined APEC in 1998 and signed an 
MFN agreement with Japan a year later. In addition, as a member of the WTO since 2007, 
it is bound to many MFN agreements. Each time such a major agreement was reached, 
Vietnam’s trade with that region expanded, and these trade agreements were clearly an 
impetus to ongoing domestic economic reforms (Abbott, Bentzen and Tarp, 2009).In the 
period 1997-2003, average tariffs on merchandise were reduced slowly from 21% to 20.3% 
while ERP decreased quickly from 121% to 46% (Athukorala, 2004).  
Figure 4.2 shows the trends in ERP and import penetration in the following years 
from 2003 to 2008, using the industry level data used in this study.  As we can see, ERP 
continued a downward trend with values lower than 50%. Labor intensive sectors such as 
Wearing Apparel, Tanning and Dressing of Leather are more highly protected than others. 
ERP are positive for most industries; reflecting that returns to capital and labor are higher 
in these industries than they would have been in the absence of tariff protection. However, 
negative ERP shows that firms in these industries can be harmed by intervention, i.e. 
Manufacture of Refined Petroleum Products, or they would be worse off under free trade 
because of being highly supported by state intervention (Appendix C.1). 
Under CEPT/AFTA, Vietnam is committed to reducing tariffs on all but few 
sensitive items from AFTA member countries to less than 5% by the year 2006.  Within 
the WTO accession framework, the 2006 average tariff levels will be reduced from 17.4% 
to 13.4% after the implementation period, generally from 5 to 7 years. The average 
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reduction of tariffs for industrial products is from 16.3% to 12.2% over 12 years. 
Vietnam’s participation in the Information and Technology Agreement was the most 
significant, by which about 330 tariff lines for information technology products will be 
reduced to 0% over a period of 3-5 years. Its participation in the Textile and Clothing 
Agreement leads to a significant tariff reduction for these items, in particular textiles from 
40% to 12%, and clothing from 50% to 20% (MUTRAPII, 2008). 
Figure4.2: Tendency of ERP and Import Penetration at Industry Level, 2003-2008 
 
4.3.2. Labor market in Vietnam: An overview 
 Vietnam’s population is estimated at approximately 89 million in 2010, of which 
over 61.6% is under 25 years of age. Approximately 15.5% of the population are 
considered to be trained or skilled workers (with elementary qualifications or higher) 
(MUTRAP, 2011).  The labor force increased by 2.4 million to a total of 49.3 million 
persons from 2007 to 2009, together with an increase in the labor force participation rate of 
2.1% to76.5% in 2009. Labor has a tendency to move from the countryside to large cities 
like Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh city (HCMC), leading to continuous increases in the proportion 
of the urban population of working age. For example, 1.8 million people moved during 
2007-2009 (MOLISA
49
, 2010). The restructuring of state owned enterprises and opening 
up to foreign direct investment has led to a redistribution of the labor force, with workers 
moving from the state sector to private enterprises.  
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After WTO accession, employment continues to undergo structural changes with a 
decreasing share in the agriculture sector but increasing shares in the industry and service 
sectors. During the period 1999-2009, the percentage of workers in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing sectors reduced from 64.1% to 51.9%, while that in industry and construction 
and service sectors increased from 12.4% and 23.4% to 21.4% and 26.7% respectively. 
The unemployment and underemployment rates in urban areas are 4.6% and 3.3% in 2009 
(GSO, 2000, 2010
50
). 
Only 23.1% of the labor force are contracted employees, while the majority of 
workers are self-employed (38.47%) or work in a family business (38.43%). However, 
demand for skilled labor in Vietnam has increased. The rapid development of the private 
sector in Vietnam is the key cause behind the growing demand for labor (VCCI, 2008). In 
the period 2006-2008, 54% of employees were based in the private sector, 22.2% in the 
foreign invested sector, and 23.8% in the state sector. Taking into consideration the gender 
composition, female workers accounted for circa 44% of the total workforce. A larger 
proportion of female workers are present in industries such as manufactures of Wearing 
apparel, Dressing, or Leather Tanning and Dressing (82%-83%) while male workers tend 
to work in manufactures of Coke, Petroleum, Metal products or Transport Equipment 
(80%). Interestingly, more female than male workers appear in high-tech manufactures 
which produce office machinery, communication equipment, or medical instruments (70-
75%) (GSOa, 2010). 
Wages of employees are subject to minimum rates determined by MOLISA at 
district levels and by enterprise ownership (e.g. VND 1.2 million per month, app. US$ 70-
75, in Hanoi 2008, for employees in foreign enterprises; and VND 0.8 million for those in 
domestic enterprise).
51
Average salary levels were highest in state enterprises, followed by 
FDI firms and non-state enterprises. For instance, the values are 4.067; 3.005; and 2.273 
million dongs per month in 2008 respectively. A worker in the manufacturing sector can, 
on average, earn VND 2.342 million per month in 2008 (GSOa, 2010). 
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 Statistical Year Book 2000, 2010 (GSO) 
51
 The minimum wage in 2012 in Hanoi is VND 1.550 million for foreign enterprises, or VND 1.350 million 
for domestic enterprises. 
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4.3.3. Overview on SMEs 
An enterprise is small or medium when its number of employees is lower than 300 
or its registered capital is less than VND 10 billion (nearly 500, 000 US$). According to 
the GSO from 2001 to 2009, SMEs in the whole economy, on average, accounted for 96% 
of total enterprises in terms of employee size or 86% in terms of registered capital. The 
growth rate of SMEs in terms of number of employees or registered capital is around 22% 
annually (Table 4.1). Also, SMEs in the manufacturing sector accounted circa 87% of total 
manufacturing enterprises in terms of employee size in the period 2005-2009.  
Table 4.1: Number and Share of SMEs by Size of Capital and Employees 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total No. of  
enterprises 
42,297 51,680 62,908 72,012 91,756 112,950 131,318 155,771 205,689 
No. of SMEs and 
growth rates 
(No. of employees 
<300) 
39,897 
 
- 
49,062 
 
23.0% 
59,831 
 
21.9% 
69,697 
 
16.5% 
88,222 
 
26.6% 
109,338 
 
23.9% 
127,593 
 
16.7% 
1517,80 
 
19.0% 
201,580 
 
32.8% 
Shares of SMEs in 
total 
94.3% 94.9% 95.1% 96.8% 96.1% 96.8% 97.2% 97.4% 98.0% 
No. of SMEs and 
growth rates 
(Registered capital 
<10 VND billion) 
36,306 
 
- 
44,670 
 
23.0% 
54,217 
 
21.4% 
61,977 
 
14.3% 
79,420 
 
28.1% 
98,232 
 
23.7% 
114,341 
 
16.4% 
131,888 
 
15.3% 
171,231 
 
29.8% 
Shares of SMEs in 
total 
85.8% 86.4% 86.2% 86.1% 86.6% 87.0% 87.1% 84.7% 83.2% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on many versions of Statistical Year Books (GSO, 2001-2009) 
4.4. Data Description 
 The industry level data used in this study come from the GSO, which is an 
institution directly under Ministry of Investment and Planning, conducting statistical 
operations and providing socio-economic statistical information at both micro- and macro- 
levels in Vietnam. The firm level data is obtained from the DANIDA’s SME surveys 
collected in 2005, 2007 and 2009.  The sample sizes are 2,603 in 2005 (representing 13.2% 
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of total manufacturing enterprises), 2,492 in 2007 (8.8%) and 2,492 in 2009 (5.1%).The 
SME surveys are funded by DANIDA and conducted by the Department of Economics, 
University of Copenhagen in collaboration with the Vietnamese Institute of Labor Science 
and Social Affairs (ILSSA) and Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM). 
Although they are implemented in 10 selected provinces (Ha Noi, Phu Tho, Ha Tay, Hai 
Phong, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong, Ho Chi Minh City, and Long An), 
a stratified random sample was chosen such that the data set is representative at the 
provincial level. A rich and intensive range of questionnaires cover many modules such as 
general characteristics, enterprise history, production characteristics, employment, 
investments, etc.
52
 Each survey in a year collects information for two previous years (e.g. 
the survey in 2005 aims to obtain data in the years 2003 and 2004). 
 Especially, the surveys are suitable for studies in labor markets. For example, the 
employment module produces information on employment by gender, full-time/ part-time 
status, occupation, workers’ training, labor union, workers’ benefit, recruiting and firing 
process, and wage setting process. Unfortunately, the survey does not specifically ask 
about educational or skill levels of the employees, only their occupation, i.e., managers, 
professionals, sales, service or production workers.  Professionals are defined as those 
having university/college degree (Phan, 2009). Since the information on educational or 
skill levels of the employees are not given, we proxy for the skill composition of 
employment by using the share of production workers in total firm employment, as in 
Revenga (1997).
53
 
 Panel data sets are used for the empirical analysis, comprising 93 industry 
observations and 8,849 firm observations from 19 manufacturing sectors in the period 
2003-2008. The firm-level data set retrieved from DANIDA is merged with the industry-
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 For instance, some studies, using the same source of data, investigate the role of unions (Torm, 2012), or 
the informal sector wage gap among Vietnamese micro-firms in Vietnam (Rand and Torm, 2012). Torm, 
Larsen, and Rand (2011) examine the impact of recruitment ties on wages in Vietnam. 
53
 Skilled labor activities include engineering, management, administration, and general office tasks while the 
activities of unskilled workers include machine operation, production supervision, repair, maintenance and 
cleaning (Hanson and Harrison, 1995). 
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level data, i.e. ERP and import penetration. ERP are collected from MUTRAP II (2008), 
MUTRAP III (2010) for the years 2005-2008and Chu and Kalirajan (2011) for the year 
2003.
54
 ERP in 2004 are assumed equal to the indicator in 2003 due to lack of data. Import 
penetration ratios are calculated based on data collected from the GSO’s reports on 
International Merchandise trade of Vietnam in several years.
55
 
 Table 4.2 presents means and standard deviations of key variables, separated into 
two periods 2003-05 and 2006-08 at industry and firm levels. The calculation strategy and 
explanations for these variables are introduced in Appendix C.3. Vietnam is involved more 
in trade liberalization in the latter period when completing the AFTA agreement in 2006 
and joining the WTO in 2007. Thus ERP reduced to 17.7% in this period as tariff barriers 
were gradually lifted. The average import penetration ratio increased over this period, as 
would be expected.  
 Since liberalizing the economy, average industry employment increased, 
accompanied by a higher proportion of female workers. Average SME firm size was 
smaller in terms of employment, together with a reduction in the presence of male and 
production workers.
56
 An SME’s real output increased by 9.6% over the two periods. 
Wages cost of capital and log capital stock/value added also increased. Real quasi rents per 
worker increased from 13.4 million VND to 20.5 million VND.  Furthermore, the 
decreased share of production workers, representing a higher proportion of skilled workers 
in a firm, may strengthen the bargaining power. 
  
                                                 
54
 ERP of an industry is measured by industry value added at domestic price, divided by that at world price, 
then minus 100%. This approach is applied by Trinh and Kobayashi (2012) for the Vietnamese 
manufacturing industries. 
55
 Theoretically, import penetration ratios should be measured as the share of imports in domestic demand 
(imports/[production + import – exports]); however, there are problems with measuring domestic demand in 
some industries, which give rise to inconsistencies such as negative domestic demand (Jenkins, 2004). 
56
 Shares of female and production workers are only available for the years 2004, 2006, and 2008. We 
assumed these indicators in the previous years are the same as at the current years. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics, 2003-2008 
Variables 
(Mean and Standard Deviations) 
Industry-level data Firm-level data 
2003-5 2006-8 2003-5 2006-8 
Total employment 123,911 
[148,278] 
161,136 
[188,384] 
18.99 
[128.59] 
15.46 
[34.74] 
  -  Share of female workers (%) 44.9 
[18.9] 
48.6 
[19.6] 
33.8 
[27.1] 
35.1 
[26.5] 
   - Share of production workers (%)   78.5 
[18.7] 
65.7 
[19.8] 
Real output (bill.VND) 25,500 
[28,500] 
41,300 
[45,300] 
2.5 
[17.5] 
2.74 
[12.3] 
Real annual earnings per worker (mill. 
VND) 
17.9 
[8.7] 
20.6 
[7.8] 
7.51 
[10.5] 
10.8 
[11.5] 
ERP (%) 28.97 
[36.90] 
17.70 
[19.55] 
  
Import penetration ratio (%) 
(Except Manufacture of Coke and 
Refined Petroleum) 
70.3 
[84.3] 
94.0 
[132.5] 
  
Cost of capital (mill. VND) 
 
  29.5 
[377] 
62.2 
[526] 
Price raw materials (mill. VND)   1,810 
[14,700] 
1,910 
[9,210] 
Real quasi rents per worker (mill. VND)   13.4 
[103] 
20.5 
[82.8] 
Log Capital stock/Value Added   1.134 
[1.326] 
1.160 
[1.230] 
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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4.5. Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization at the 
Industry-Level 
We start off by investigating the impact of trade liberalization on employment and 
wages using industry level data.  To do so, we follow Milner and Wright (1998) and 
Revenga (1997) and estimate simple reduced form employment and wage equations in the 
following form, 
                              𝜎  𝜎       𝜎       𝜎                                 ( ) 
and 
                                                             𝑣                 ( ) 
where    ,    ,    is respectively total employment, the average real wage measured in 
terms of annual earnings, and total output, in industry j at time t.
57     is a vector of trade 
liberalization variables, including ERP and import penetration. The equations also include 
time (t) and industry (j) specific effects.  All nominal variables are deflated by producer 
price index. 
 The results in Table 4.3 present the industry-level employment and wage responses 
to trade liberalization. For the purpose of estimations, equations (1) and (2) are differenced 
in order to transform out the specific effects, then the OLS and within estimates are 
applied. Unlike time specific effects, industry specific effects are eliminated by the 
difference transformation of variables. 
Columns 1 and 2 provide the results for the estimated employment equation. 
Increases in average wage rates cause a fall in employment, whereas changes in industry 
output and ERP appear to have no impact on demand for labor. Furthermore, the results 
indicate the negative and significant impact of rising imports on employment. An increase 
in import penetration from 57% to 95% is associated with a mere 0.76% (=0.38*0.02) 
decline in labor demand. Alternatively, we only find evidence for a modest impact of the 
increasing import penetration on industry-level employment. This finding could potentially 
                                                 
57
 This labor demand equation can be derived based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, assuming that 
the cost of capital is captured by time dummies (Milner and Wright, 1998).   
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reflect the existence of rent sharing agreements between firms and workers in Vietnam. As 
explained by Revenga (1997) “to the extent that the dissipation of rents is fully absorbed 
through lower industry wages there need not be any effect on employment”. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the similar findings for the estimated wage equation in the 
same period. The results for the wage effect of trade liberalization are more statistically 
significant compared to those obtained for employment. The coefficient on import 
penetration is negative and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in imports 
reduced real wage. However, the implied wage responses are minor:  an increase in import 
penetration from 57% to 95% is associated only with a 0.49% (=0.38*0.013) decline in 
real wages. Furthermore, the coefficient on ERP is significant in OLS or closes to being 
significant in within estimates implies that reduction in ERP is associated with decreasing 
industry wages. A decline in ERP from 39% to 17% reduced real industry wages by 2.4%-
3.5%. 
Table 4.3: Industry Employment and Wage Equations with OLS and Within Estimations 
 Employment Wages 
 OLS 
(1) 
Within 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Within 
(4) 
Employment   -0.523***(0.112) -0.657***(0.057) 
Average real wage -0.639***(0.123) -0.829*(0.445)   
Output  0.101 (0.168) -0.050 (0.195) 0.026 (0.174) -0.097 (0.278) 
ERP 0.061 (0.213) 0.045 (0.162) 0.110*(0.063) 0.166 (0.114) 
Import penetration -0.016**(0.006) -0.020***(0.004) -0.006*(0.003) -0.013*(0.006) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.52 0.69 0.38 0.58 
Observations  60 60 60 60 
(i) (***), **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
(ii) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
In sum, the existence of a minor negative employment effect of trade liberalization 
seems to support the rent sharing model. Furthermore, as proposed by Feliciano (1994) and 
Currie and Harrison (1997), we can also link this phenomena to the existence of 
restrictions to the firing of workers and the imperfections of product market in Vietnam. 
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By contrast, the industry regression reveals a bigger negative association between trade 
reform and wages. Unfortunately, the industry-level analysis cannot go further in 
explaining what causes the trade-induced decline in wages and employment in Vietnam. 
Hence, we now turn to a firm-level analysis in order to look more closely at possible 
channels.   
4.6. Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization at the 
Firm-Level 
Our analysis at the firm level follows closely Revenga (1997), Ghazali (2011) and 
Abowd and Lemieux (1993).We adopt a wage-setting model allowing for the presence of 
rent-sharing behavior under union influence, and competitive wage determination. 
Accordingly, firms and the union bargain only over wages, and then employment is set 
unilaterally by the firm at the level that maximize its profit. 
                            
  (    )   
     (   
     
 )     
                           ( ) 
where   reflects the bargaining power of worker in firm i,    
  is the union’s preferred 
wage outcome, and    
 is the alternative/outside wage, representing comparative wage 
(assumed to be the wage in the corresponding industry). 
 As the union’s preferred wage outcome is not observed, (   
     
 )could represent 
product market competition, namely the quasi rents per worker. Equation (3) can be 
rearranged as: 
         (   )     
                                                   ( ) 
Where     is considered as a quasi-rent-splitting parameter, reflecting how much of the 
quasi rents is captured by the union.
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 If there is heterogeneity in workers’ bargaining power, we can rewrite equation (4) 
as follows: 
                                                 
58
 As in Revenga (1997), quasi rents per worker are constructed as QRit = (Yit – Mit – ritKit – wit
A
Nit) / Nit 
where Yit is sales, Mit is the cost of material inputs, ritKit is the cost of capital inputs, Nit is total employment 
in firm i at time t. 
78 
 
                                             ̅  (   )     
      (   )                              ( ) 
 The error component in this equation is correlated with the regressor QR(wit). Thus, 
we need to use instrumental variables estimation. As shocks to quasi rents per worker are 
likely to result from shocks to product demand or shocks to the costs of production, trade 
policy changes would be relevant instruments, which can influence the behavior of both 
firms and unions.
59
 
 For the empirical implementation, we apply the following equation for firm wage 
determination:  
                                       
             𝑣                  ( ) 
where   ,  
 ,      are as above. All nominal variables are deflated by the producer price 
index.   ,    are firm and time fixed effects. We include the ratio of capital to value added 
       that shows the firm efficiency in using capital stock and, hence, can determine 
wages (Ghazali, 2011). 
 Through the rent sharing approach, trade policy changes can affect firm-level 
wages through two different channels: (1) Changes in industry-level trade barriers should 
have a direct impact on the outside wage by shifting the total industry labor demand; and 
(2) Trade liberalization is able to reduce the sector rents and, hence, to reduce the rent 
component of wages in the firms where rent-sharing exists. We use two trade policy 
instruments for quasi rents per worker, namely, the ERP (e.g., Ghazali, 2011; Krishna, 
Poole, and Senses, 2012)
60
 and import penetration (e.g., Feliciano, 2001; Kien and Heo, 
2009).  
                                                 
59
 Abowd and Lemieux (1993) rely on export and import price indexes as the instruments for quasi rents in 
the case of Canadians firms. Alternatively, Revenga (1997) uses industry-level tariffs and quotas for the case 
of Mexican manufacturing. 
60
 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 2005) and Ghazali (2011) emphasize that ERP changes during trade reform 
episodes are not sector-uniform. ERP movements in many developing countries result from government 
decisions to fulfill the GATT and WTO directives that bound the behavior of firms or unions in influencing 
trade policy changes. Hence, this would minimize the endogeneity risk.  
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 In the empirical analysis we also augment equation (6) by adding some more 
independent variables and instruments depending on our purposes in investigating skilled-
unskilled and male-female wage gaps under the impacts of trade liberalization and the role 
of unions. 
 As regards a firm’s employment response to trade liberalization, changes in trade 
policy can influence employment through their effect on wage setting. If workers are 
willing to trade off wages (e.g., by giving away rents), they may be able to preserve jobs. 
In the case workers prefer to maintain the level of wages, a larger employment effect may 
be observed. Furthermore, trade policy changes directly affect employment by shifting 
firm’s output. As a result, output is endogenously determined in the firm-level employment 
equation. Therefore, we also use ERP and import penetration as instrumental variables. 
                              
                             𝑢       ( ) 
where    ,   ,   
 ,    ,    ,       are respectively the number of workers, annual average 
real wage, annual industry real wage, real output, the cost of capital, and the ratio of capital 
to value added in firm i at time t.     is the disturbance term. 
We begin the empirical analysis with the firm-level employment equation to 
observe the magnitude of the implied employment response to trade policy changes. We 
then identify the effect of trade liberalization on firm wages in several steps. First, we 
explore the importance of rent sharing in firm-level wage determination. Second, we 
measure the size of firm quasi rents that are affected by trade policy variables and their 
interactions with the gender composition of a firm’s labor force. For further analyses and 
robustness checks, we also consider heterogeneity in bargaining power depending on the 
skill composition of the workforce and the role of trade union location. Apart from firm 
fixed effects and year effects, we also add industry fixed effects to control for unobserved 
time-invariant industry characteristics.
61
 
                                                 
61
 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar 
observable characteristics in unprotected sectors when they do not control for unobserved time-invariant 
industry characteristics. With industry fixed effects, the result reverses: trade protection increases relative 
wages. 
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Table 4.4: Results of 2SLS Firm Employment Equations 
 2SLS (First stage) 2SLS (Second stage) 
 Dependent variable: real 
output 
Dependent variable: firm 
employment 
Real output  1.193** (0.465) 
Firm real wage 0.525*** (0.020) -0.858*** (0.245) 
Industry real wage 0.051 (0.051) -0.005 (0.054) 
Cost of capital 0.138*** (0.009) -0.084 (0.065) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.149*** (0.017) 0.052 (0.071) 
ERP 0.056 (0.071)  
Import penetration -0.004* (0.002)  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Instruments   ERP 
  Import penetration 
F-test (p-value) 0.077  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.697 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (p-value)  0.001 
Observations  3907 3907 
(i) (***), (**), and (*) denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses. 
The two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of equation (7) is reported in Table 
4.4. The dependent variable is the log of total employment. The independent variables are 
the firm and industry real annual average wage, the price raw materials, and real output. 
Instruments used for the endogenous real output variable are ERP and import penetration.  
We report the F-statistic for the relevance of excluded instruments (associated p-
value) from the first-stage regression. When the F-statistic is small (or the corresponding 
p-value is large), the instrumental variable estimates and confidence intervals would be 
unreliable. We find that our instruments are appropriate on this criterion. Furthermore, the 
instruments are valid as indicated by the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, which 
cannot reject the hypothesis of the instrument validity. Additionally, the Durbin-Wu-
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Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressor (real 
output variable) can be treated as exogenous. 
The first stage estimates reveal a negative and significant effect of increased 
imports on firm real output, though the point estimate is small (-0.004). The coefficient on 
ERP gets the expected sign but is statistically insignificant. The second stage estimates 
indicate statistically significant parameters for the firm real output and average wage. By 
contrast, the coefficients on the industry real wage, the cost of capital, and the capital stock 
to value added are insignificant.  
Empirically, the findings give evidence that increases in import penetration that 
reduce firm output have a negative effect on employment. Based on the first stage 
estimates, an increase in import penetration from 57% to 95% reduces firm output by 
0.15% (=0.38*0.004). This in turn is associated with a decline in employment by only 
0.18% (=0.15%*1.193%). In addition, reductions in ERP do not have any significant effect 
on output and therefore have no impact on employment. Combining these results with 
those obtained from the industry-level equation, we can argue that there is minor impact of 
trade liberalization on employment in Vietnamese manufacturing, as in line with Currie 
and Harrison (1997) and Feliciano (2001).  
We now turn to estimating wage effects.  In the industry level analysis we found 
that there is a negative relationship between trade reforms and wages. In the firm-level 
analysis, it is possible to explore the mechanisms for that adjustment. 
Table 4.5 gives results from estimating equation (6) using a within estimator. We 
find evidence for a positive and statistically significant coefficient on quasi rents across all 
specifications. Hence, rent sharing appears an important component of wage determination 
in Vietnam. Technically, the quasi-rent-splitting parameter determines how much of the 
quasi rents is captured by the union. In the case these rents are completely transferred to 
union members, we can have a simple figure from the coefficient on the quasi rents per 
worker in column 1 that, on average, union members get earnings that are about 16% 
higher than non-union members. This finding to some extent is in line with the results by 
Torm (2012).  Using matched employer-employee panel data, she empirically indicates an 
average union wage gap of about 13% in Vietnam’s SMEs over the 2007-2009 period.  
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Table 4.5: Within Estimates of Firm Wage Equations 
 Dependent variable: Firm real average wage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Quasi rents per worker (QR) 0.165*** (0.005) 0.218*** (0.038) 0.226*** (0.016) 
QR*[QR-avg(QR)]  0.007 (0.012)  
QR*female share   -0.055*** (0.015) 
Industry real wage 0.380*** (0.055) 0.227*** (0.083) 0.396*** (0.060) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.052*** (0.006) -0.042*** (.010) -0.057*** (0.007) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.39 0.34 0.42 
Observations  8849 3969 7072 
(i) (***), (**), and (*) denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses. 
The coefficients on the industry real wage and the capital stock to value added have 
expected signs and are highly significant across specifications. This indicates that firm 
wages are also affected by industry labor market conditions and the efficiency in using 
capital input. Following Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Revenga (1997), and Ghazali (2011), 
we also include a term QR*[QR-avg(QR)]that measures the deviation of firm-level quasi 
rents from the sample average. Similar to Revenga (1997), however, we do not find 
evidence for heterogeneity in bargaining power for firms in the same sector, as indicated 
by the statistically insignificant coefficient on this variable. 
In column 3, we incorporate an interaction variable that allows the quasi-rent-
splitting parameter to vary systematically with the proportion of female workers in the firm 
workforce. The coefficient on this interaction variable is negative and significant, which 
shows that the quasi-rent-splitting parameter is inversely correlated with the proportion of 
female workers in total firm employment. The point estimate is small (-0.055), but gives 
evidence of male-female earnings inequality in Vietnam.
62
 The negative interaction term 
                                                 
62
 Torm (2012) finds evidence that there is a substantial gender wage gap with male earnings being between 
14% - 18% higher than for women. 
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suggests that the positive effect of QR on firm real wage is lower for firm with high female 
share. The higher the proportion of female workers, the lower the ability of workers to 
capture part of the quasi rents. 
In case that quasi rents per worker variable is endogenous, the within estimates 
above might be biased and inconsistent. To deal with this problem, an instrumental 
variables approach will be used for the endogenous quasi rents per worker. Instruments for 
QR are ERP and import penetration. 
The 2SLS regressions are presented in Table 6. The result in column 2 supports the 
flexible model of wage setting that captures both the existence of rent sharing behavior and 
competitive wage determination. However, the first estimates result in column 1 does not 
show any statistically significant impact of ERP and import penetration on QR. It might be 
due to the fact that these chosen instruments are weak as the F-test point shows (p-value = 
0.179). 
In order to attain relevant instruments, the existence of gender earnings differentials 
in the trade liberalization episode suggests to further include interaction variables that 
permit trade policy changes to vary with the proportion of the female workers in the firm 
labor force. Therefore, besides trade policy variables, we also add their interactions with 
the gender composition of the firm workforce as instruments for QR. F-test and Sargan test 
now indicate the relevance and validity of the chosen instruments. The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the endogenous variable. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the 2SLS estimation results with the interaction variables. 
The first estimates show a positive and significant effect of ERP on quasi rents per worker. 
Furthermore, the results point out the gender composition of the workforce appears to be 
highly relevant. The higher the proportion of female workers in the firm, the less trade 
liberalization decreases the quasi rents per worker. Hence, these findings indicate that trade 
liberalization may reduce the gender earnings gap in Vietnam.  
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Table 4.6: Results of 2SLS Firm Wage Equations Regarding Gender Composition 
 2SLS (First stage) 2SLS (Second stage) 2SLS (First stage) 2SLS (Second stage) 
 Dependent variable: 
quasi rents per worker 
Dependent variable: 
firm average real wage 
Dependent variable: 
quasi rents per worker 
Dependent variable: 
firm average real wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quasi rents per worker  0.549* (0.291)  0.487*** (0.112) 
Industry real wage -0.501*** (0.079) 0.374*** (0.141) -0.529*** (0.079) 0.340*** (0.067) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.309*** (0.019) 0.074 (0.091) -0.304*** (0.019) 0.054 (0.036) 
ERP -0.103 (0.088)  0.246* (0.140)  
ERP*female share   -0.650*** (0.196)  
Import penetration 0.005 (0.004)  -0.003 (.006)  
Import penetration*female share   0.031** (0.015)  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments  ERP   ERP 
 Import penetration   ERP*female share 
    Import penetration 
    Importpenet*femaleshare 
F-test (p-value) 0.179  0.000  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.853  0.891 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (p-value)  0.052  0.000 
Observations  6564 6564 6549 6549 
(i) (***), (**), and (*) denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses. 
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The second stage estimates also show a positive and highly significant coefficient 
on quasi rents per worker. This indicates that decreases in ERP that reduce quasi rents have 
a negative effect on wages. This is not the case for the import ratio, however.  A decrease 
in ERP from 39% to 17% reduces quasi rents by a 5.4%. This in turn is associated with a 
2.6% decline in firm wages. Combining this finding with the industry-level wage 
estimates, we find wage declines in an interval of 2.4%-3.5% in Vietnamese manufacturing 
over the 2003-2008 period that is due to trade liberalization. 
Further analyses and robustness checks 
 The potential heterogeneity in bargaining power and the existence of union wage 
gaps suggest that workers do vary in their ability to extract rents across firms and regions. 
Determinants of this differential ability might come from the influence of unions in the 
local market and the skill composition of the firm workforce. 
We reestimate equation (5) now allowing for interactions of the trade policy 
variables and the skill composition of a firm’s workforce in the first stage estimation. To 
further check robustness, we add two cost variables in real terms (cost of capital and price 
raw materials) and one interaction variable that allows the quasi-rent-splitting parameter to 
vary systematically with the fraction of unskilled workers in the second step. Furthermore, 
we also add industry fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant industry 
characteristics to the specification. 
Results are reported in Table 4.7. The estimated coefficient on quasi rents per 
worker is consistent across various specifications and highly significant in both sign and 
magnitude. The quasi-rent-splitting parameter gets the similar value of about 0.34 across 
specifications, implying that 34% of quasi rents is captured by the union when skill 
composition of the firm workforce and industry fixed effects are taken into account.  
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Table 4.7: Results of 2SLS Firm Wage Equations Regarding Skill Composition 
 All observations Obs. in the Centre and North All observations 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
 QR Firm real wage QR Firm real wage QR Firm real wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
QR  0.342*** (0.097)  0.344*** (0.117)  0.338*** (0. 092) 
QR*unskilled share  -0.372** (0.146)  -0.404*** (0.155)  -0.263 (0.174) 
Industry real wage -0.593*** (0.112) 0.115 (0.077) -0.692*** (0.152) 0.152 (0.095) -0.888** (0.290) 0.358* (0.199) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.465*** (0.034) -0.133** (0.054) -0.462*** (0.052) -0.144*** (0.053) -0.478*** (0.034) -0.087 (0.074) 
Cost of capital -0.002 (0.019) -0.011 (0.008) -0.035 (0.026) -0.012 (0.013) -0.009 (0.019) -0.013 (0.008) 
Price raw materials 0.186*** (0.030) 0.001 (0.024) 0.149*** (0.045) -0.025 (0.024) 0.178*** (0.031) -0.017 (0.030) 
ERP 2.375*** (0.433)  2.765*** (0.580)  2.464*** (0.465)  
ERP*unskilled share -2.788*** (0.539)  -3.209*** (0.705)  -2.821*** (0.556)  
Import penetration -0.016 (0.022)  -0.018 (0.027)  -0.044 (0.033)  
Import penet*unskilled 
share 
0. 046 (0.030)  0. 060* (0.035)  0. 027 (0.031)  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
F-test (p-value) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.282  0.409  0.567 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
(p-value) 
 0.020  0.006  0.113 
Observations  3023 3023 1889 1889 3023 3023 
(i) (***), (**), and (*) denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
(ii) Standard errors in parentheses.   
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 For all specifications, the coefficients on the interaction variable QR*unskilled 
share are negative and statistically significant (or close to being significant once industry 
dummies are included) thus, confirming the evidence of skill earnings inequality in 
Vietnam.
1
 
 The significant and negative coefficient of ERP*unskilled share, furthermore, 
reveals that the higher the proportion of unskilled workers in the firm, the less trade 
liberalization decreases the quasi rents per worker. This suggests that the bargaining power 
of unskilled workers may increase following trade liberalization, as in line with a simple 
HO/SS story. Vietnam specializes in unskilled intensive goods, so trade liberalization 
means they expand in those goods, giving more power to the unskilled workers. 
 In columns 3 and 4 we do a similar exercise but only include firms located in the 
North and Centre of Vietnam. Given the historical and institutional context combined with 
the higher concentration of collective agreements in HCMC, south vs rest of country split 
may reveal interesting results relating to bargaining power of workers and skill earnings 
gap across regions.
2
 
                                                 
1
 Torm (2012) indicates that a worker with education beyond secondary school has a wage that is about 12% 
higher than a worker with only basic education. 
2
 Before the reunification in 1975, southern trade unions were more independent toward the government than 
northern trade unions which were under the oversight of the Communist Party (Edwards and Phan, 2008). 
Despite the reunification, some of the ideological and institutional differences between the two parts of the 
country are long lasting through today (see Kim, 2008). Zhu et al. (2008) find that firms in Hanoi (the 
Vietnam’s capital in the North) remain more oriented towards traditional personnel practices, including 
government wage scales and unions’ involvement as government agents, whereas firms in HCMC (the 
biggest city in the South) have a higher rate of adoption of modern human resource management. It is 
estimated that only 20% of unionized private sector firms have collective agreements, although in HCMC, 
the figure is around 65% (Clarke, Lee, and Chi, 2007). Torm (2012) also documents that trade unions in 
southern firms might be more accountable to their members than the rest of the country. 
 
88 
 
 Column 4 shows that the size of the quasi-rent-splitting parameter is statistically 
unchanged. However, the coefficients on the interaction variable QR*unskilled share, trade 
policy variables and their interactions with the skill composition of the firm workforce are 
significantly larger in absolute value compared to those attained for all observations. They 
suggest that firm wages in the North and Centre are more influenced by the decline in ERP 
and the increase in imports. Also they reveal that earnings differential between skilled and 
unskilled labor is more serious in these regions than elsewhere.  
 In columns 5 and 6, industry fixed effects are added to the specification to control 
for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics. The estimated coefficients on quasi 
rents per workers, the interaction variable, trade policy variables and their interactions with 
the skill composition of the firm workforce are in line with priors in terms of sign and 
statistical significance. 
 To sum up, the firm-level study provides evidence on negative effects of trade 
liberalization on employment and wages with similar magnitudes as industry-level 
analysis. The firm-level analysis also indicates that reductions in quasi rents and firm 
output in the period of trade reforms are channels for those adjustment mechanisms. 
Interestingly, increased imports play a minor part in reducing employment, while 
decreased ERP is responsible for a larger decline in wages. 
4.7. Conclusion 
The vulnerability of wages and employment to trade liberalization is always 
concerned in developing countries, including Vietnam where has been strongly involved in 
trade openness in the recent years. Vietnam is characterized by the large proportion of 
SMEs and high rates of unskilled workers. Trade liberalization in this economy goes hand 
in hand with commitments to cut down tariffs when joining the AFTA and the WTO. 
Although trade affects labor market in different ways, the economic model in this study 
analyzes the response to trade liberalization through the industry wage premium, which in 
turn, represents rent sharing. By this approach, given trade policy variables such as ERP 
and import penetration could stimulate a direct effect on wages and employment at 
89 
 
industry level but an indirect impact at firm level. Therefore, they are treated as 
instruments in order to deal with endogeneity in the firm-level analysis. Furthermore, this 
approach permits us to investigate factors such as worker gender or skill in capturing part 
of quasi rents.  
Our econometric analysis suggests that there is a negative effect of trade 
liberalization through decreased ERP on wages in Vietnamese manufacturing, although the 
impact is moderate. As regarding import penetration, we find a negatively significant but 
minor impact on firm employment. That means imports might not be a cause for rising 
anxiety over increasing unemployment.  
In addition, we find evidence of gender and skill earning inequalities in Vietnamese 
manufacturing, and these gaps decrease under trade liberalization. Furthermore, when 
taking into account the influence of unions by region, trade unions and collective 
agreements seem to reduce the skill earnings differentials in Vietnamese manufacturing. 
In conclusion, we should not have a negative look on the response of labor market 
to trade openness for the case of Vietnam. Instead of fearing trade liberalization, Vietnam 
should enhance domestic policies to protect unskilled or female workers by upgrading 
education and training level, strengthening the role of trade unions in firms, or launching 
policies to help enterprises improve their productivity in order to ensure greater fairness in  
the allocation of rents to workers and create more jobs.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
  
 This dissertation consists of three empirical works, focusing on the case of Vietnam 
to deal with “old” topics in international trade: trade liberalization, FDI, and labor market. 
However, it contributes “new” approaches and findings compared to previous studies 
within the same fields. 
5.1. FDI and Productivity Spillovers 
 In the first two papers related to FDI and its spillovers to domestic firms, we apply 
the method of Javorcik (2004) to calculate horizontal, backward and forward spillovers. 
Chapter 2 expands this calculation strategy separately for the service and manufacturing 
sectors, which is applied for firms with different managerial skills and ownership. Overall, 
we find that although domestic firms after WTO accession did not benefit from FDI 
inflows in through intra-industry linkages, they can take advantages of inter-industry 
linkages to improve their productivity. 
 Spillovers differ through intra-linkages or inter-linkages. We argue that spillovers 
are driven by the bargaining power of firms, which is based on the nature of input linkages 
of a manufacturing firm with a supplier or a customer in intra-sectors or inter-sectors. With 
the role as a supplier of a domestic manufacturing firm, foreign firms in manufacturing can 
bring a worse spillover than those in manufacturing firms, since their products are essential 
while firms in service sectors find themselves in a very competitive environment, in the 
case of Vietnam. By contrast, with the role as a customer of a domestic manufacturing 
firm, the appearance of foreign firms in downstream manufacturing can better stimulate the 
productivity of domestic firms than those in service sectors.  
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 The main findings of this study lie in the role of managerial skill. The educational 
level of a director is particularly meaningful for a local enterprise in improving its spillover 
absorptive capacity. A firm having a director with higher managerial skill can strongly 
stimulate the ‘demonstration’, ‘competition’ and ‘labor mobility’ channels in order to 
improve its productivity. We also find that a private indigenous firm is always more 
dynamic than an SOE in absorbing productivity spillovers.  
 Chapter 3 also adopts the approach of Javorcik (2004), but focuses on calculating 
backward spillovers for different origins of investors. This paper is the first to find specific 
characteristics of investments from one origin rather than focusing on bilateral 
relationships between the source and host countries (Rodrigez-Clare, 1996) and 
multilateral relationships (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011). By calculating LTI by origins, 
we find that investments from one origin could be high-tech or low-tech intensive. In order 
to explain this argument, it is based on the assumptions of ‘demonstration effects’ and 
‘comparative advantage’. Given this background, our striking findings are that, ‘for a 
developing country like Vietnam, the origins of which foreign firms demand more low-
tech products, i.e. with higher LTI, can cause higher spillovers to domestic firms through 
backward linkages’. Nonetheless, the spillovers are strongly distorted by the regional 
preferential trade agreement and foreign affiliates’ import capacity from neighbor 
countries.  
 What could be further exploited in these topics? In order to draw a general picture 
of FDI spillovers in the case of Vietnam, we could analyze this problem over a longer 
period, namely since Vietnam has been strongly involved in trade liberalization. The 
endogeneity issue of a production function has not been completely dealt with, particularly 
for the role of managerial skill, as we only have 2 years of data. Additionally, our findings 
for the role of investors’ nationalities are still driven by stronger hypotheses that refer to 
the relationship between Vietnam and neighboring countries. Therefore, our hypothesis is 
only fully checked whenever these factors are excluded. These are our tasks to work on in 
the future. These papers would also be more interesting if we had data for other countries 
in the Southeast Asian region, for the purpose of comparison. A further research direction 
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is that we could replace the role of foreign affiliates with domestic firms in Javorcik’s 
methodology in order to investigate the response of foreign enterprises’ productivity to 
domestic supplying industries or market access. This research direction would provide 
some reasons for foreign affiliates to enter or exit an economy.  
5.2. Trade Liberalization and Labor Market 
 Chapter 4 has attempted to analyze the extent to which the increasing international 
integration of the Vietnamese economy affected employment and wages between 2003 and 
2008. The degree of international openness of this country has risen in the past decade, 
together with the decreasing trends of tariffs and ERPs yet the increasing trend of imports 
and exports. The labor market is associated with the growth of labor supply, which is 
mostly unskilled from agriculture sectors. Meanwhile, increasing FDI inflows and new 
firm entrants have triggered labor demand for skilled workers.  
 In this study, we examine the changes in wages and employment at industry and 
firm levels through the channel ‘industry wage premium’, which is affected by trade policy 
such as EPR and import penetration in Vietnamese manufacturing (as in Revanga, 1997; 
Ghazali, 2011). The analysis provides evidence that industries’ and firms’ average wages 
are negatively associated with trade liberalization, however the impact is moderate. 
Additionally, we find a minor negative impact of trade liberalization on industry-level and 
firm-level employment. 
 Using the quasi-rent approach, as similar to Revenga (1997) and Ghazali (2011), 
we can further analyze gender and skill earnings inequality. We find that a larger 
proportion of female or unskilled workers cause the lower ability of workers to capture part 
of quasi rents. Nevertheless, trade reforms can lessen the quasi rents per worker for firms 
with higher presence of female or unskilled workers. This could disclose an insightful 
result that trade liberalization moderates wage gaps between male-female and unskilled-
skilled workers. Furthermore, trade unions and collective agreements can help to reduce 
the skill earnings differentials in Vietnamese manufacturing. Therefore, efficient education 
and training systems, plus social security systems are necessary to reduce wage inequality, 
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as referred to in OECD Employment Outlook (2007) that good domestic policies can 
assure workers receive their fair share of gains from globalization. 
 This paper could be complemented in several ways in considering availability of 
data. First, we can take characteristics of firms into account, for example, non-exporters 
and exporters (as in Bernard et al., 2007), high/low levels of outsourcing, or large/small 
firms. Due to self-selection effects, it is expected that the response of wage and 
employment to trade openness differs by type of firms. Second, if we approach trade 
liberalization through increasing imports and exports and use new data sources from the 
GSO’s enterprise surveys, we can analyze the different results of trade effects on labor 
market between the manufacturing and service sectors. Finally, an open direction is to 
further examine changes in wage and employment to FDI inflows, as trade liberalization is 
usually combined with increasing capital influx. Through this approach, we can gain 
insight into how competition between domestic firms and foreign affiliate impacts changes 
in average wages and employment in Vietnam. 
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Appendix 
A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
Appendix A.1:  Means of Horizontal, Backward, and Forward by Industrial Sector 
Sectors 
Horizontal Backward 
Backward_ 
Manuf.g 
Backward_ 
service  Forward  
Forward_ 
Manuf.g 
Forward_ 
service  
1. D15 .3567 .0106 .0020 .0085 .0503 .0406 .0097 
2. D16 .0059 .0019 .0001 .0018 .0925 .0865 .0059 
3. D17 .5833 .1684 .1665 .0019 .1514 .1452 .0061 
4. D18 .4314 .0549 .0529 .0020 .2881 .2808 .0073 
5. D19 .7286 .0051 .0032 .0018 .1666 .1629 .0037 
6. D20 .2463 .3381 .3297 .0084 .0740 .0681 .0058 
7. D21 .3314 .1282 .1096 .0185 .1216 .1133 .0082 
8. D22 .0319 .1173 .0442 .0731 .2174 .2106 .0067 
9. D23 .4221 .1146 .0748 .0397 .0980 .0944 .0036 
10.D24 .4489 .1222 .1038 .0184 .1232 .1059 .0172 
11.D25 .3623 .2781 .2725 .0056 .1483 .1442 .0041 
12.D26 .2343 .0982 .0579 .0402 .1021 .0942 .0079 
13.D27 .2364 .2208 .2078 .0130 .0415 .0381 .0033 
14.D28 .4479 .1606 .1561 .0044 .1723 .1653 .0070 
15.D29 .3801 .0870 .0805 .0064 .1785 .1687 .0097 
16.D30 .8346 .1017 .0955 .0061 .1876 .1775 .0100 
17.D31 .4378 .0984 .0892 .0092 .0699 .0670 .0029 
18.D32 .7049 .0145 .0099 .0046 .0561 .0473 .0088 
19.D33 .7331 .4102 .3756 .0346 .0954 .0918 .0036 
20.D34 .6526 .0053 .0048 .0004 .1795 .1698 .0096 
21.D35 .5836 .0064 .0051 .0012 .2187 .2124 .0063 
22.D36 .4921 .1534 .1402 .0132 .1249 .1197 .0051 
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Appendix A.2: Manufacturing Industries, 2 digits (VSIC, 1993) 
 D.    Manufacturing 
1. D15. Manufacture Of Food Products And Beverages 
2. D16. Manufacture Of Tobacco Products 
3. D17. Manufacture Of Textiles 
4. D18. Manufacture Of Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing Of Fur 
5. D19. Tanning And Dressing Of Leather ... 
6. D20. Manufacture Of Wood And  Products Of Wood ... 
7. D21. Manufacture Of Paper And Paper Products 
8. D22. Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 
9. D23. Manufacture Of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear Fuel 
10. D24. Manufacture Of Chemicals And Chemical Products 
11. D25. Manufacture Of Rubber And Plastics Products 
12. D26. Manufacture Of Other Non - metallic Mineral Products 
13. D27. Manufacture Of Basic Metals 
14. D28. Manufacture Of Fabricated Metal Products ... 
15. D29. Manufacture Of Machinery And Equipment &etc. 
16. D30. Manufacture Of Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 
17. D31. Manufacture Of Electrical Machinery And Apparatus & etc. 
18. D32. Manufacture Of Radio, Television And Communication Equipment 
19. D33. Manufacture Of Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments ... 
20. D34. Manufacture Of Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi - trailers 
21. D35. Manufacture Of Other Transport Equipment 
22. D36. Manufacture Of Furniture; Manufacturing & etc. 
23. D37. Recycling 
Source: the GSO 
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
Appendix B.1: Manufacturing Industries, 2 digits (VSIC, 1993), by Technology Level 
 Low_ 
tech 
High_ 
tech 
D.    Manufacturing 
1. X  D15. Manufacture Of Food Products And Beverages 
2. X  D16. Manufacture Of Tobacco Products 
3. X  D17. Manufacture Of Textiles 
4. X  D18. Manufacture Of Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing Of Fur 
5. X  D19. Tanning And Dressing Of Leather ... 
6. X  D20. Manufacture Of Wood And  Products Of Wood ... 
7. X  D21. Manufacture Of Paper And Paper Products 
8. X  D22. Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of Recorded Media 
9. X  D23. Manufacture Of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And Nuclear 
Fuel 
10.  X D24. Manufacture Of Chemicals And Chemical Products 
11. X  D25. Manufacture Of Rubber And Plastics Products 
12. X  D26. Manufacture Of Other Non - metallic Mineral Products 
13. X  D27. Manufacture Of Basic Metals 
14. X  D28. Manufacture Of Fabricated Metal Products ... 
15.  X D29. Manufacture Of Machinery And Equipment and etc. 
16.  X D30. Manufacture Of Office, Accounting And Computing Machinery 
17.  X D31. Manufacture Of Electrical Machinery And Apparatus and etc. 
18.  X D32. Manufacture Of Radio, Television And Communication 
Equipment 
19.  X D33. Manufacture Of Medical, Precision And Optical Instruments ... 
20.  X D34. Manufacture Of Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi - trailers 
21.  X D35. Manufacture Of Other Transport Equipment 
22. X  D36. Manufacture Of Furniture; Manufacturing and etc. 
23. X  D37. Recycling 
*Notes: Manufacturing industries classified according their global technological intensity (OECD, 1993, 
ISIC Revision 2) 
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Appendix B.2: Distribution of Backwards and Horizontals by Origin 
Backwards by Origin 
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Horizontals by Origin 
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Appendix B.3: Map of Southeast Asia (www.asean.org) 
 
 
100 
 
Appendix B.4: Domestic Firms’ Exit and Foreign Firms’ Presence by Origin 
 
. cloglog exit  Hasean Hamerica Hchina Heurope Hjapan Hsouthkorea Htaiwan Hmulti, 
vce(robust) 
 
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood=  -58202.26   
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -58020.538   
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -58019.944   
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -58019.944   
 
Complementary log-log regression                Number of obs     =     114733 
                                                Zero outcomes     =      91125 
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =      23608 
 
                                                Wald chi2(8)      =     605.48 
Log pseudolikelihood = -58019.944               Prob> chi2       =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
exit |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hasean|  -1.336842   .2152006    -6.21   0.000    -1.758628   -.9150568 
Hamerica |   9.441873   .5931252    15.92   0.000     8.279369    10.60438 
Hchina |   2.292388   .4044771     5.67   0.000     1.499628    3.085149 
Heurope |   .5128116   .1857903     2.76   0.006     .1486693     .876954 
Hjapan |   1.001466   .1006913     9.95   0.000     .8041151    1.198818 
Hsouthkorea |   1.277942   .1252088    10.21   0.000     1.032537    1.523347 
     Htaiwan |   .4557845   .0971485     4.69   0.000     .2653769    .6461922 
      Hmulti |   -.897728   .1606302    -5.59   0.000    -1.212557   -.5828987 
       _cons |  -1.710897   .0209211   -81.78   0.000    -1.751902   -1.669893 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
Appendix C.1: Effective Rate of Protection in Vietnam by Industry 
INDUSTRY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Food Products And Beverages .522 - .313 .299 .288 .273 
Tobacco Products .857 - .457 .457 .46 .463 
Textiles 1.23 - .51 .618 .179 .183 
Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing 
Of Fur 
1.651 -  .136 .58 .584 
Tanning And Dressing Of Leather ... .698 - .463 .463 .558 .503 
Wood And  Products Of Wood ... .112 - -.023 -.023 -.022 -.026 
 
Paper And Paper Products .412 - .18 .236 .224 .208 
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of 
Recorded Media 
.137 - .1 .12 .06 .1 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And 
Nuclear Fuel 
 - .05 -.0097 -.0094 -.0056 
Chemicals And Chemical Products .079 - .022 .111 .11 .102 
Rubber And Plastics Products .345 -  .353 .351 .322 
Other Non - metallic Mineral Products .376 - .25 .294 .284 .26 
Basic Metals -.067 - -.01 -.096 -.074 -.067 
Fabricated Metal Products ... .053 - .03 .0056 .0085 .012 
Machinery And Equipment and etc. -.142 - -.085 -.057 -.051 -.048 
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus and 
etc. 
.12 - .16 .059 .058 .058 
Radio, Television And Communication 
Equipment 
.11 -  .039  .032 .016 
Medical, Precision And Optical 
Instruments ... 
-.009 - 0 -.028 -.028 -.029 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi - 
trailers 
.571 - .326 .32 .31 .3 
Other transport equipment .274 - -.09 .083 .084 .083 
Furniture; Manufacturing and etc. .457 - .57 .387 .361 .328 
Source: MUTRAP II (2008), MUTRAP III (2010) for the years 2005-2008 and Chu and Kalirajan 
(2011) for the year 2003 
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Appendix C.2: Import Penetration in Vietnam by Industry 
INDUSTRY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Food Products And Beverages .135 .135 .129 .129 .154 .175 
Tobacco Products .18 .196 .064 .027 .017 .033 
Textiles 1.506 1.121 1.285 1.041 1.065 1.223 
Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing 
Of Fur 
.345 .35 .116 .066 .052 .052 
Tanning And Dressing Of Leather ... .468 .386 .357 .307 .068 .071 
Wood And  Products Of Wood ... - - .375 .45 .417 .386 
Paper And Paper Products .389 .393 .564 .572 .346 .561 
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of 
Recorded Media 
.058 .081 .091 .093 .112 .063 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And 
Nuclear Fuel 
36.107 35.483 38.626 33.057 56.571 30.624 
Chemicals And Chemical Products .607 .518 1.615 1.498 1.685 1.591 
Rubber And Plastics Products .562 .578 .339 .346 .357 .393 
Other Non - metallic Mineral Products .114 .112 .118 .102 .112 .119 
Basic Metals 1.386 1.305 2.074 2.429 2.306 2.578 
Fabricated Metal Products ... - - .228 .234 .291 .275 
Machinery And Equipment and etc. - -  4.329 4.901 5.315 6.204 
Office, Accounting And Computing 
Machinery 
- - .87 .909 .863 .511 
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus and 
etc. 
- - .588 .496 .655 .749 
Radio, Television And Communication 
Equipment 
- - 1.244 1.435 1.315 1.972 
Medical, Precision And Optical 
Instruments ... 
- - 3.248 4.154 3.124 1.746 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi - 
trailers 
1.064 1.02 .684 .468 .659 .78 
Other transport equipment - - .176 .13 .346 .314 
Furniture; Manufacturing and etc. - - .135 .131 .134 .126 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the GSO’s reports on International Merchandise trade of 
Vietnam in several years 
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Appendix C.3: Calculation Strategy and Explanations for Key Variables 
 Real output Industry or firm output, deflated by the Producer Price Index (year 
2000=100; unit: bill.VND). 
Employment - Total number of worker in an industry; or, 
- Total number of full-time workers in firms at the year-end. 
Real wage - Average industry wage; or, 
- Total payments for employees divided by total firm employment, then 
deflated by the Producer Price Index (year 2000=100; unit: mill. VND). 
Cost of capital Total interest payment of firms in a year, deflated by the Producer Price 
Index (year 2000=100; unit: mill. VND). 
Price raw materials Value of raw materials used, deflated by the Producer Price Index (year 
2000=100; unit: mill. VND). 
Real quasi rents 
per worker 
QR = (Y – M – r*K – w
A*
N) / N, deflated by the Producer Price Index (year 
2000=100; unit: mill. VND), where Y, M, r*K, N respectively denote firm 
sales, the cost of material inputs, the cost of capital inputs, and total firm 
employment(Revenga, 1997). 
Capital 
stock/Value Added 
Total physical assets at the year-end, divided by total value added, then 
deflated by the Producer Price Index (year 2000=100) 
ERP Effective rate of protection, as in percentage, collected from MUTRAP II 
(2008), MUTRAP III (2010), and Chu and Kalirajan (2011). 
Import penetration 
ratio 
Percentage of imports in total output. 
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